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THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION: THE INFLUENCE OF 
LEGAL TRADITION ON FRENCH AND AMERICAN 
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Dana Zartner Falstrom· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the months leading up to the U.S. intervention in Iraq in March 2003, the 
dialogue between the United States and France on the appropriate course of action to 
take in response to Iraq's report on its weapons of mass destruction revealed 
differences between these traditional allies as to the options available under 
international law. These differences did not center on the goals of any proposed 
action-both sides in fact agreed upon the goals, 1 which were to ensure there were no 
weapons of mass destruction; to prevent an increase in terrorist activity; and to address 
the continuing violations of international law perpetuated by Saddam Hussein. 2 What 
was in dispute, however, was the timing and form of action available under 
international law.3 In particular, France and the United States were unable to come to 
• Adjunct Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. The author wishes to thank Pro-
fessor Martin Rogoff, Ilse Teeters-Trurnpy, and the entire staff at the Maine Law Review for their comments 
and assistance. She would also like to extend heartfelt thanks to Miroslav Nincic, Larry Peterman and 
especially Carl Falstrom for their encouragement and support. 
I. This has been the case most often post-WWII. France and the United States typically agree upon 
the goal, but disagree about the means of attaining that goal. See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 
29 (2004). 
2. Interview with Jacques Chirac, at the French Ministry ofForeign Affairs (Feb. 16, 2003), available 
at http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/France/mfa/france-mfa-chirac-021603.htm. Mr. Chirac stated: 
Id. 
Nor do we have any differences over the goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein's weapons of 
mass destruction. For that matter, if Saddam Hussein would only vanish, it would without 
a doubt be the biggest favour he could do for his people and for the world. But we think this 
goal can be reached without starting a war. 
3. France's position, highlighted by President Chirac on March IO, 2003: 
We have said: ''we want to disarm Iraq." ... We unanimously chose the path of disarming 
him. Today, nothing tells us that this path is a dead end and, consequently, it must be 
pursued since war is always a final resort, always an acknowledgement of failure, always the 
worst solution, because it brings death and misery. And we don't consider we are at that 
point. That's why we are refusing to embark on a path automatically leading to war so long 
as the inspectors haven't told us: ''we can't do any more." And they are telling us the 
opposite. 
Interview with Jacques Chirac, at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. I 0, 2003), available at 
http://www.iraqwatch.org/govemment/France/mfa/france-mfa/chirac/03 l 003.htm. Contrast this with the 
following statement by President Bush on December 2, 2003: 
Americans seek peace in this world. We're a peaceful nation. War is the last option for 
confronting threats. Yet the temporary peace of denial and looking away from danger would 
only be a prelude to broader war and greater horror. America will confront gathering dangers 
early, before our options become limited and desperate. By showing our resolve today, we 
are building a future of peace. In the decisions and missions to come, our military will carry 
the values of America and the hopes of the world. The people of Iraq, like all human beings, 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 339 2006
2006] THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION 339 
agreement on whether a valid interpretation of the international laws of war would 
allow for the United States' proposed anticipatory intervention, or whether pre-existing 
notions limiting military intervention to imminent threats were binding on any 
proposed action, no matter how noble the goal.4 
The United States and France ultimately did not see eye to eye on the appropriate 
course of action and in the end, the United States entered Iraq without the support of 
the French. Many saw this as a manifestation of a growing divide between the two 
countries. The reasons given for this rift have been plentiful-the French resent U.S. 
power; the United States resents France's efforts to balance the United States with a 
stronger European Union; the two countries disagree on trade relations; there is a 
general growing anti-American sentiment among the French population. But do these 
accounts truly provide an explanation for the disagreement between the two counties? 
In fact, is it true that there is even a significant division between France and the United 
States in terms of the laws of war? Or for that matter, is there, as many of the above-
mentioned theories would indicate, is there an underlying division between the two 
states when it comes to international law and the international system generally? 
Many might argue the evidence is overwhelmingly so. But do these explanations truly 
provide an accurate depiction of French and American behavior? 
To address these questions, this essay will examine the approaches of France and 
the United States towards international law. In doing so, I suggest that although in the 
past several decades France and the United States have frequently approached 
international law from different perspectives, neither view results in a greater notion 
of justice nor an absolutely better record of compliance with international law. At the 
same time, however, I consider why these two countries, although similar in many 
ways (both countries are advanced, industrialized democracies founded on the liberal 
principles of the Enlightenment), and although both having past records of adhering 
to international law, have a historical tension in their approaches to international law. 
That tension is evident in both countries' willingness to recognize and adhere to 
international law, and their willingness to change it. 
desetve their freedom. And the people of Afghanistan-with the help of the United States 
Armed Forces-have gained their freedom. 
Press Release, The White House, President Signs National Defense Authorization Act (Dec. 2, 2002), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021202-8.html. 
4. The norms of just war have long been recognized to include, in addition to the right of self-defense 
if attacked, the right to engage in military operations if a state is under imminent attack. While there has 
been debate over the meaning of the term 'imminent,' it has been held that the definition put forth by U.S. 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case provides fundamental guidelines: "exceptions 
growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which 
the 'necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
for deliberation."' 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 ( 1906). In the recent 
debate over Iraq, the argument made by the U.S. further pushed this conception of anticipatory strike. The 
U.S. position was that, in a world of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction the possibility of attack 
takes on a new meaning, and this new meaning calls for new interpretations of international law. France, 
on the other hand, preferred to maintain the existing definition of imminent attack, considering the evidence 
available as to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to be insufficient. For further discussion of the Caroline 
Doctrine, see Martin Rogoff & Edward Collins, The Caroline Incident And The Development Of 
International Law 16 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 493, 498 (I 990). 
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I contend that understanding this tension is key, not only for understanding the 
recent disagreement between the two states, but for explaining the different approaches 
the two states have taken to international law. Further, I theorize that this tension can 
be illuminated by an examination of the legal traditions that have shaped the behavior 
of the two countries. Specifically, I suggest that the different legal traditions of 
France and the United States contribute to the different outcomes we have seen in 
terms of the two countries and their treatment ofinternational law. The legal tradition 
of a state, developed from the state's history with law and conception of the role oflaw 
in society, coupled with the legal and political institutions that have developed out of 
this history, help to determine the position a state affords international law as a guiding 
force in determining state behavior. France and the United States certainly maintain 
many similarities, and remain close allies in many situations. However, different legal 
histories and perceptions of the role of law have led to different beliefs today that 
shape the idea of international law as a guiding factor affecting state behavior. Beliefs 
that are shaped by legal tradition include conceptions of state sovereignty and the 
willingness of a state to give up absolute sovereignty for a cooperative purpose; 
acceptance of foreign relationships and entanglement; and whether change is better 
made through multilateral, diplomatic discourse, or through more direct action adopted 
to fit new and changing circumstances. France and the United States sometimes have 
different positions on these beliefs, positions developed through history and reinforced 
through the creation of institutions and the evolution of perceptions of law. It is these 
differences which cause the United States and France to view international law through 
different lenses, and which can thus result in conflict between the two on how 
international law should be treated in any given situation. 
The French legal tradition, founded on a mixture of Roman law, Canon law, and 
local custom, and heavily influenced by the French Revolution and France's position 
in Europe, has developed into one in which law plays a central role in the life of all 
French people. 5 The centrality oflaw and the conception that law exists to benefit the 
community facilitates the incorporation of international legal principles into the 
domestic legal framework. 6 The influence of the French tradition on the political and 
5. The continental conception of law, which prevails in France, is very different [from the 
common law]. Although law is certainly the concern of jurists, it is not their concern alone. 
It involves the whole population, because it establishes the very principles of social order and 
thus tells citizens how they should behave, in accordance with the community's ideas of 
what is moral and just. Law should not be, and is not, an esoteric science; rather, it must be 
accessible to the greatest possible number of persons. Because it has an educational role, it 
is linked to the whole prevailing existential philosophy. It takes the place of social morality 
and, for some, aspires to replace religion itself. 
RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAw: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 73 (Michael Kindred trans., 
Louisiana State U. Press 1972) (1960). 
6. International law is, of course, created at the international system level through multilateral 
discussion, treaties, and the work of international organizations. Compliance with international law, 
however, must take place through incorporation of international legal principles into the domestic legal 
structure of a state. For a state to truly comply with its international legal obligations it must believe such 
rules are binding. In countries like France and the United States (i.e. representative democracies) it is the 
voting population that influences government decisions about state behavior. The better international law 
is incorporated into the domestic framework, the more likely the populations of these states are to 
acknowledge and accept its tenets, and the more likely it is that the population will want the government to 
act according to those tenets that it feels are binding. Once incorporated, principles of international law are 
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legal institutions of the state, on the sources oflaw and methods of interpretation used, 
and on the public perception of the role of law and the position of France towards 
international law shapes the behavior of France when acting within the international 
system. 
The legal tradition of the United States, on the other hand, originating in the 
common law tradition of England, but influenced by the principles of the American 
Revolution and by the unique circumstances of the growth and development of the 
United States as a country, uses the law primarily as a mechanism to protect individual 
interests. 7 This focus inward and concentration on individual rights founded in U.S. 
legal history has made more varied the recognition of the settled interpretations and 
binding force of international law by the United States. Moreover, in addition to the 
general attitude about law, the structure of the political and legal institutions in the 
United States makes incorporation ofinternational law into the domestic legal system 
more difficult. Thus, although it is generally a state that adheres to international law 
and supports the international legal system, the United States has historically been 
more likely than France to push the outer boundaries of accepted concepts of inter-
national law. 
In this essay, I will discuss the role of the French and American legal traditions 
in explaining each state's behavior in terms ofrecognition and adherence to existing 
international law. Although not suggesting this is an all-encompassing explanation for 
the behavior of these two states, I propose consideration of legal traditions as a key 
contributing factor; a hypothesis supported by historical analysis. For purposes of this 
essay, I will use as my primary example the international laws regarding anticipatory 
intervention that was the central point of debate leading up to the Iraq intervention in 
2003. However, I suggest that this same theory would explain the behavior between 
these two countries in terms of public international law generally. 
The first section of this essay will define legal tradition and explain the importance 
of legal tradition as an explanatory variable for state behavior. In examining the 
influence of legal tradition, I focus on four specific components: the historical 
development of the tradition; the legal institutions developing out of the tradition; the 
sources of law and their interpretation that form part of the tradition; and the public 
perceptions of the role oflaw stemming from the legal tradition. I will next tum to a 
discussion of the legal traditions of France and the United States, focusing my 
discussion on the historical development of law in each country and how this 
development has influenced the modem-day role oflaw in each of the states. In doing 
so, I will concentrate on the values underlying the historical development of law and 
how this has influenced the legal institutions which have developed, the sources and 
interpretation oflaw, and the role oflaw in society as perceived by the population of 
each country. Third, I will discuss the role that legal tradition plays in influencing a 
state's behavior in the international system, particularly in regards to the treatment of 
viewed in the same manner as domestic laws, both in terms of binding authority and in terms of 
interpretation and alteration. 
7. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ET AL., MICHAEL WALLACE GoRDON, & CHRISTOPHER 
OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (2d ed. 1994); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STA TES: FROM THE 
BEGINNINGS TO THE PRESENT 12 (Derek Coltman trans., 1978). 
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international law. In doing so I will also examine some of the key alternative 
explanations that have been put forth to explain the different views of France and the 
United States. I suggest that rather than refuting these alternative explanations, 
considering a state's legal tradition provides the constitutive framework through which 
all other variables influence decision-making. Finally, I will conclude with a 
discussion of the importance of understanding the subtle differences among legal 
traditions in order to minimize the potential for misunderstanding, as was evident 
between the two countries leading up to the 2003 Iraq intervention. 
II. THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRADmON 
Although state behavior in the international system has long been the subject of 
academic discussion, the role that law and legal institutions play in framing state 
behavior has received scant coverage in the literature. 8 Perhaps paradoxically, when 
considering a state's approach to international law, it is important to first examine its 
domestic treatment of law, arising as it does out of a state's legal tradition. This is 
because for international law to be binding on a state it must be incorporated from the 
international system level into the domestic legal system. While power, interests, and 
reputation 9 are all factors in a state's determination ofits appropriate course of action, 
whether in the domestic or international arena, each of these factors is framed in terms 
of the legal possibilities and the perceptions of the just course of action for the state. 
It is therefore important to consider the influence of legal tradition on a state's 
domestic behavior as a paramount factor in determining the approach a state takes in 
determining how it will function within an international legal framework. 
A. What is a Legal Tradition? 
Legal tradition has been defined as a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned 
attitudes about the nature oflaw, the role oflaw in the society and the polity, and the 
proper organization and operation of a legal system. 10 The legal tradition of a state 
arises out of the historical and cultural roots that led to the formation of modem legal 
institutions within the state, and thus affects the way law is used as well as the 
perception of the population towards law and its role in society. This applies to both 
national law as well as international law. 
8. A few scholars have identified the need for the fields of international law and international relations 
to consider legal explanations for state behavior. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLEY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed. 
1963); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual 
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 205 (1993) [hereinafter Slaughter Burley, A Dual Agenda]; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary 
Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 367 (1998) [hereinafter Slaughter, New Generation]; Beth Simmons, 
Compliance with International Agreements, I ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 75 (1998) [hereinafter Simmons, Int'/ 
Agreements]; Beth Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000) [hereinafter Simmons, Commitment & 
Compliance]. However, none of these scholars have evaluated legal tradition from a historical perspective 
in order to determine its role in framing state decisions regarding international law. 
9. For a discussion of alternative theories on state behavior, see Part V. 
I 0. William Tetley, Mu:ed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. 
L. REV. 677, 682 (2000). 
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The legal tradition that develops within a particular state is both a function of a 
multitude of historical factors, and a framework that allows certain institutions and 
beliefs to develop. In both France and the United States, revolution and principles of 
the Enlightenment have had a great influence on the legal tradition. From these 
notions-captured in the works of Locke, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Tocqueville, and 
Rousseau-institutional arrangements have come into existence which further the 
underlying values concerning the law prevalent in the two systems. 11 While France 
and the United States share many core values, the differences in history surrounding 
the development of these values and the situations in which the countries have found 
themselves post-revolution have created differing conceptions of law between the 
two.12 
B. A Theory on the Influence of Legal Tradition 
This paper suggests that the legal traditions of France and the United States 
illuminate the different perspectives of the two countries regarding international law. 
A country's legal tradition shapes all aspects oflaw within that society. Legal tradition 
influences the role oflaw in a society and the institutional structure of its legal system, 
as well as its general political system and the public perception oflaw in terms of what 
it is designed to achieve. These components combine to create the framework in 
which a government makes decisions about the appropriate course of state action. 
France, with its civil law tradition founded on a mixture of Roman law, Canon law, 
and customary law, and combined with a history of authoritarian government and a 
delayed realization of the French Revolution's democratic principles, has developed 
a particular set of beliefs about the role of law and consequently the place of 
international law. On the other hand, the United States, with its legal tradition arising 
out of English common law but heavily influenced by the American Revolution, the 
ideas of the Enlightenment philosophers, and the unique geographical position of the 
United States in the world, has developed a different perspective. When these different 
perspectives collide, as they did in the case of the United States intervention in Iraq in 
2003, France and the United States are very likely to disagree on the international 
legality of particular actions. 
Accordingly, a state's legal tradition is the underlying force behind its treatment 
of international law. A state's level of compliance with international law is a function 
of the historical role oflaw, both domestic and international, within the state, as well 
as the role the population of the state feels the law should play. Legal tradition can 
create a binding sense of legal obligation and an identifiable course of appropriate 
action, while at the same time shaping the state's interests, which remain an integral 
11. See JOHNLocKE, TwO'fREATISESOFGoVERNMENT{Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690); CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. 
Cobler et al. trans. eds. Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748); MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE 
ESSAYS (M.A. Screech ed. Penguin Books 1991); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
(Stephen D. Grant trans. Hackett Pub!' g Co., 2000) ( 1835); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRA TSOCIAL 
(G.F. Flammarion 1992) (1762). 
12. For a discussion of the different interpretations of constitutionalism between the two states, see 
Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison o/Constitutionalism in France and The United States, 49 ME. L. REv. 21 
(1997). 
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part of any state decision-making process. More specifically, contemporary attitudes 
towards the authority of existing international law can best be seen as a function of a 
state's historical legal tradition and how this legal tradition shapes the legal culture and 
institutional structures within each state. Beyond the reality that France is a civil law 
state and the United States a common law state, 13 the underlying historical and cultural 
characteristics that form the foundations of these two legal traditions have created 
differing perspectives in the two countries on the role oflaw in society, the acceptance 
of international law as a form of law, and the freedom to push our understanding of 
law beyond existing doctrine. 
France and the United States share many similarities, stemming from the 
revolutionary principles that form the basis of each country's identity. 14 However, 
each country developed under unique historical circumstances and each produced, and 
in tum were influenced by, distinctive legal and political institutions. While both 
countries are adherents to the rule of law, France and the United States do have 
different histories when it comes to the consideration of international law. These 
differences come not only from recognition and acceptance of international legal 
principles, 15 which are greatly influenced by each state's conception of the idea of 
sovereignty, 16 but also from the treatment afforded by each state to those principles 
they hold as binding. France and the United States maintain different approaches to 
the incorporation of international law into the domestic law of the state, the authority 
given to such law, and the means by which to change such law. It is these 
differences-all stemming from the legal traditions of the state supported by unique 
historical development-that account for variation between the two countries in their 
treatment of international law. 
Both the historical ties of the civil law tradition in France and the institutional 
structures that have developed from this foundation facilitate the incorporation of 
international law into French legal doctrine. Each has created a profound awareness 
of international law in France. At the same time, the historical French connection to 
written law and the French use of codes 17 has made it more difficult for France to adapt 
quickly to changes in the international system that may require corresponding changes 
in international law. As a legal culture that relies heavily on the mechanism of public 
discussion, which should take place before changes in the law can occur within the 
legislative body, the French legal tradition is not as able to facilitate rapid change in 
the law through highlighting differences in present cases compared to the past, as the 
United States attempted to do with Iraq in 2003. France is and has long been a 
diplomatic nation at its core, preferring to discuss and negotiate resolutions to crises 
13. On France, see JOHNP. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF LAW 263 (1968) ("In modem times throughout 
most of the world France is regarded as the very model of a 'civil law' country."). 
14. See Rogoff, supra note 12, at 30 ("[T]he French and American Revolutions, guided by the principles 
of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and the inalienable rights of man, together mark the transition from 
the old world to the new."). 
15. France has more readily incorporated modem international rules into its domestic legal system. For 
example, of twenty major multilateral treaties sponsored by the United Nations since I 945, France has 
ratified seventeen, compared to only six for the United States. See United Nations Treaty Database, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org (subscription required). 
16. Rogoff, supra note 12, at 58. 
17. See DAVID, supra note 5, at 11-16. 
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rather than act boldly. 18 This preference is evident throughout France's history 19 and 
was certainly the case in the months leading up to the 2003 Iraq crisis. 
On the other hand, the history and institutional characteristics of the legal tradition 
of the United States have led to the establishment of a legal culture much less 
influenced by or accepting of outside legal influences such as international law. 20 The 
incorporation of international legal norms into the domestic legal culture is 
correspondingly more difficult in the United States than it is in France. As a country 
based on the rule oflaw, however, the United States does take part in the international 
legal order, and like France complies with international rules more often than not. 
Where the two countries differ, however, are those instances where the United States 
has been willing to push the boundaries of existing international law to meet new and 
changing needs in the international system. This was the case with the U.S. push to 
alter the laws of war to include anticipatory intervention in Iraq given the new threats 
created by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Given the institutional 
structures that have developed out of the U.S. version of the common law tradition, 
with its heavy reliance on judicial lawmaking based on the distinguishing of facts (a 
mode of lawmaking considered not only the norm but also essential to allow the law 
to keep up with the times), the perception of the United States is that it is perfectly 
natural to adapt international law by acting first and arguing about legal technicalities 
later.21 This, however, is not the tradition in France, and therein lies the basis for 
disagreement. 
This essay explores the historical development of the French and U.S. legal 
traditions, and how this affects each state's approach to international law. In doing 
so, I focus on four factors that combine to support my theory that legal tradition 
influences a state's treatment of international law. The first, and most important of 
these, is the historical development oflaw and the legal tradition within the state. Any 
theory of the relationship between law and society, whether domestic law or 
international law, must rest on knowledge of the history of individual legal systems.22 
Understanding the historical circumstances surrounding the development of the French 
and American legal traditions is crucial, because only by understanding the unique 
historical characteristics present in each state during the formation of the rule of law 
18. See Interview with Jacques Chirac, supra note 3. See also KAGAN, supra note I, for a general 
discussion of France's preference for diplomacy. While Kagan's argument centers on France's use of 
diplomacy as a substitute for its lack of power relative to the United States, which is not the position of this 
paper, the historical discussion remains relevant. 
19. Examples include the period leading up to World War II, when appeasement was preferred to 
military action, and the Balkan crisis in the 1990s. For further discussion of France's preference for 
diplomacy, see generally KAGAN, supra note I. 
20. See Frederic L. Kirgis, International Agreements and U.S. Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 1997, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh I O.htm. 
21. See DAWSON, supra note 13, at xiii (noting that in the U.S., in contrast, "it seems obvious and 
beyond dispute that the application of Jaw necessarily involves some new creation .... Conflict itself ... 
is a major source of growth and change [and adjudication is the settlement of conflict]."). 
22. Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1122 
( 1983); see also CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN QUEST 1790-1860: AN EMERGING NA TJON IN SEARCH 
OF IDENTITY, UNITY, AND MODERNITY 6 (1971) ("Ifwe are to arrive at a better understanding of this harsh 
world and the kindlier one we would like to build, we must study the history of nations just as intensively 
as we study the behavior of individuals."). 
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can we understand the nature of the subsequent legal institutions and sources oflaw 
that have developed, as well as the public perception of the role oflaw in society. In 
other words, the legal tradition of a state is a constitutive factor, determining the 
position of many components of society-all of which combine to provide the 
framework under which decisions are made regarding international law. 
The second factor is that a state's treatment of international law is influenced by 
the legal and political institutions in the state. This institutional component arises 
directly out of the historical development oflegal tradition. However, as the political 
and legal institutions grow and solidify, they are not only constituted by the legal 
tradition, but they themselves become constitutive mechanisms for the recognition of, 
adherence to, and incorporation of international law within the law of the state. 23 Legal 
and political institutions include the branches of government in the state, as well as the 
separation of the branches and the powers bestowed on each (in particular, the powers 
regarding international law and the ability to change or amend the laws).24 
The third component of the legal tradition that determines a state's treatment of 
international law is the recognition of sources oflaw and the methods ofinterpretation 
of these sources. Whether or not international law becomes part of the legal toolbox 
that a state uses to make decisions about the appropriate course of action is determined 
in large part by the ease with which the international rules are incorporated into the 
domestic legal system. 25 Depending on what a legal system considers a source oflaw, 
how international law fits into that categorization is a key determining factor. 
Moreover, once an international legal rule becomes a source of law, the method of 
interpretation for these rules can also influence how influential the international rules 
ultimately are in guiding state behavior, as well as how free a state might feel to push 
the boundaries of international legal norms. 
The final component of legal tradition that contributes to a state's treatment of 
international law is the population's understanding of law and of the role of law in 
society. As with institutions and sources, public perception of law is greatly 
23. Slaughter Burley, A Dual Agenda, supra note 8, at 228. 
24. For a general discussion of the political and legal institutions of France and the United States, see 
0UROSELLE, supra note 7; JEAN-MARIE 01.JEHENNO, L' A VEN1R DE LALIBERTE: LA 0EMOCRATIE DANS LE 
MONDIALISATION (1999);PATRICEHIGONNET,SISTERREPUBLICS:THE0RIGINSOFFRENCHANDAMERICAN 
REPUBLICANISM (1988); Rogoff, supra note 12. 
25. An understanding of the domestic legal tradition matters because it is at the domestic 
level-whether government or public-where acknowledgement and adherence occur. International law 
may be developed and agreed upon at the international level, among governments and diplomats; but it is 
at the domestic level, among the population, where it gains its authority. International law is incorporated 
into domestic legal orders-those legal orders founded on a state's historical legal tradition--so that all 
citizens of a state, from the leaders to the general populace, are bound by its tenets-the tenets which form 
the framework within which all decisions are made. However, depending on what the historical 
development of the legal tradition has been and what legal institutions have come from such history, a state 
may be more or less able to incorporate international law into its domestic legal framework. The easier the 
incorporation, the more likely it will be that international law considerations form part of the basis for action 
promoted by the population. In those states where it is more difficult ( or time-consuming) to transfer 
international law from the level of diplomats to the level of domestic law, attention and adherence to 
international law will be less. See FRANCIS BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1985); 
see also RICHARD A.FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964), 
for a discussion of the importance of national courts as instruments for incorporating international law. 
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influenced by the historical development of the legal tradition within a given state. All 
societies are products of their history, as are their understandings and beliefs about law 
and what it is designed to do. This component is particularly important in a 
democratic society such as France or the United States, in that the public's perception 
of the appropriate course of action is a crucial factor in what the state does, regardless 
of its legal tradition. 26 What people think about the law and the values embedded in 
this thought have a great deal to do with how people behave and, ultimately, how they 
expect their elected representatives to behave.27 In fact, it has been said that public 
opinion is international law's ''ultimate sanction." 28 Liberal democracies like France 
and the United States base foreign policy decisions on popular support. 29 
Ultimately, this analysis leads to the conclusion that the difference of opinion 
between France and the United States on the issue of Iraq was not the monumental 
split among allies that many proclaimed, but was instead just the latest in a series of 
differing perspectives between the two nations on international law. Law is a primary 
cornerstone of any society, shaping the perceptions of justice and the sense of right and 
wrong within the society it governs. These perceptions and attitudes about law are 
historically grounded and continually reinforced by a state's legal culture and 
institutions. It is important to understand these differences in examining state behavior 
in the international system and treatment of international law. Given the constantly 
changing nature of the international community and the new problems that continually 
arise, more situations like that of Iraq are likely to occur in the future. A better 
understanding of each other's point of view may facilitate international agreement the 
next time. 
Ill. FRANCE 
What then are the different legal traditions of France and the United States that 
influence different attitudes towards international law? What follows is an examina-
tion of the historical legal tradition of each state as well as the political and legal 
institutions, sources and methods of interpretation, and public perception of the role 
of law. 
A. Historical Development 
The legal tradition of France arose over time to be one of the most influential legal 
traditions in the world.30 This tradition did not develop in isolation, but rather 
incorporated forms oflaw and ideas about law from sources as varied as the Romans, 
the Catholic Church, the German tribes, the Spanish theologians, and a succession of 
26. On the selectorate, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Policy Failure and Political Survival: The 
Contribution of Political Institutions, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 147 (1999); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., Testing Novel Implications.from the Selectorate Theory of War, 56 WORLD POL. 363 (2004). See also 
BOYLE, supra note 25; Martin Rogoff, International Politics and The Rule of Law: The United States and 
The International Court of Justice 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267 (1989). 
27. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Cultures a/Europe, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 55 
(1996). 
28. BOYLE, supra note 25, at 20. 
29. See generally FALK, supra note 25. 
30. DAVID, supra note 5, at v. 
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some of the greatest political and legal thinkers of all time. 31 This combination of 
influences has shaped not only the concept oflaw in France, but also the relationship 
that the French legal tradition has with international law. Moreover, both the 
historically unique circumstances surrounding the French Revolution and the beliefs 
which emerged from its aftermath-which include the conception that political and 
legal leaders are responsible for ensuring that law is observed and enforced-have 
contributed to the understanding of the role of law in France. 32 Finally, France's 
position at the center of Europe and its relationship to not only its European neighbors, 
but also its former colonial territories around the globe, have combined to develop 
among the French people a singular sense of state sovereignty and the role of France 
in the world, a role many see as foundational to the appropriate conception of 
international law. 33 
The historical roots of the French legal tradition can be traced to the early days of 
the Roman Empire. 34 In fact, to this day, France has remained "continuously open to 
influence from Roman law." 35 As part of the Roman Empire beginning with the first 
century B.C., France received the foundational tenets ofRoman law as compiled in the 
lex romana visigothorum in 506 A.D. 36 The laws of the Roman Empire were 
sophisticated and diverse, as they were required to cover a vast territory encompassing 
a multitude of different nations and ethnic groups, all with pre-existing local rules and 
customs at the time of incorporation into the Roman Empire. By necessity the Roman 
law developed a common law of nations: one capable of engendering order and 
31. France, being at the center of Europe, was witness to most of the influential writings of the 15th -
19th centuries on law and politics, including the works of the Glossators at the University of Bologna, 
Aquinas, Vitoria, Las Casas, Sepulveda, Montaigne, Gentili, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Vattel, Wolfe, Voltaire, Rousseau, Descartes, and Kant. For a general discussion of the 
development of international law through the works of these authors, see Joachim Von Elbe, The Evolution 
of the Concept of Just War in International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665 (1939). See also INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN POLITICAL TuOUGJIT: TExrs FROM THE ANCIENT GREEKS TO THE FIRST WORLD w AR (Chris 
Brown et al. eds. 2002). 
32. See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON, & SIMON WHITIAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW (1998) for 
a discussion of the values underlying French law and how these have contributed to the modem French legal 
system. 
33. This view that the French have had throughout their history about their place in the global system 
and what they can offer others is referred to as la mission civilisatrice. Discussion of la mission civilisatrice 
and what it has meant for the development of France's position in the world and French law can be found 
in TZVETAN TOOOROV, ON HUMAN DIVERSITY: NATIONALISM, RACISM, AND EXOTICISM IN FRENCH 
TuOUGHT (Catherine Porter trans. 1993). See also ERNST ROBERT CURTIUS, THE CMLIZATION OF FRANCE 
(1932); TZVETAN TOOOROV, LA CONQU~TE DE L'AMERIQUE: LA QUESTION DE L'AUTRE (1982); Rogoff, 
supra note 12. 
34. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 263 ("In its history ... France ... remained continuously open to 
influence from Roman law."). See generally DAVID, supra note 5. 
35. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 263. 
36. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAIOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY, 34 (2d ed. 
1978). This was especially true in the Southern portion of France. The Northern part of France remained 
for the most part a pays de droit coutumier, rather than a pays de droit ecrit. The customary law of Northern 
France, in fact, became the foundations for the English common law after William gained the English throne 
in 1066. The Southern portion of France (South of the Loire), as a region of written law, had extensive 
reception of Roman law, to the point where local custom almost disappeared. For further discussion of the 
development of the Roman law in France, see generally DAWSON, supra note 13; GLENDON ET AL., supra 
note 7. 
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security in Roman territory, yet also providing unifying principles which regulated 
such common activities as trade and treatment of government representatives in 
foreign territories. 37 This early form of international law, or law between nations, is 
still reflected in both our modern international law and in those countries, such as 
France, that received the Roman law tradition. 
French law developed from this early Roman law, both based on the codification 
of the Roman law in the Corpus Juris Civilis by Justinian, and (more noticeably) from 
the jus commune developed by the Glossators at the University of Bologna at the 
beginning of the Renaissance.38 The glosses and later commentaries in the 12th and 
13th centuries adapted classical Roman law to the problems of the day. In doing so 
they were heavily influenced by the new spirit of rational inquiry and freedom from 
the literalism that characterized earlier Roman law.39 Although France was still a 
country with multitudes of individual laws and practices, 40 French law from the period 
of the early 14th century until the time of the French Revolution in the late 18th 
century steadily incorporated the treatises on Roman law coming out of the universities 
across Europe. 
These "French-Roman" foundations are responsible for a number of unique 
characteristics of the French legal tradition that facilitate the modern day incorporation 
of international law into the French system and shape French attitudes about law. 
First, in addition to France, many if not most other countries belonging to the civil law 
tradition share legal characteristics based on their historical ties to the Roman law.41 
The resulting cohesiveness among these states in terms of general understandings of 
law facilitates engagement in international relations without the types of misunder-
standings that the United States and France have shared. Second, because the system 
of Roman law itself incorporated components of international law, including laws 
governing war, diplomacy, and trade, understanding and incorporating international 
law into the domestic legal framework is a historical commonality for a country like 
France. By comparison, the United States' history with international law did not begin 
until the 18th century.42 
Besides Roman law, the most important historical influence on the development 
of the French legal tradition and the French conception oflaw is the Canon law of the 
37. On the Roman law generally, including further discussion ofthejus gentium, see J.L. BRIERLEY, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed. I 963); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADmON (1983); THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TOMODERN 
CML LAW (1999). 
38. France stretched across the main invasion routes in the northward advance of Roman law. 
The south of France, roughly one-third the area of modem France, was already governed by 
a vulgarized Roman law inherited from the earlier Middle Ages. In the late 1 IOO's the 
doctrines of the Bologna school were taught at Montpellier by Placentinus, himself one of 
the well-known doctors of Bologna. Other men also who had been trained at Bologna lived 
and wrote in twelfth century France. 
DAWSON, supra note 13, at 263. See also GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48-49. 
39. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 48. 
40. Voltaire famously noted that one traveling across France changed laws as often as one changed 
horses. MICHAELBOGDAN,COMPARATIVELAW 167 (1994). 
41. See generally DA YID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36; GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7. 
42. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 100 (explaining that Roman law has helped maintain some attitudes 
about law in France that differ from those held in the United States). 
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Catholic Church. In the Middle Ages, after the Roman Empire fell, France lacked any 
unifying authority or source of law. Into this breach rose the Catholic Church.43 
Subsequently, in the 11th and 12th centuries, the revival of Roman law combined with 
the spread of the Canon law through the works of such eminent scholars as Thomas 
Aquinas. This combination of Roman and Canon law allowed the latter's status as a 
guiding force for the moral aspects of society to supplement the former's practical 
utility.44 The fact that Canon law continued to influence French legal thought up to the 
revolutionary period provides a crucial component of the French legal tradition. 
France's historical ties to the moral principles of the Canon law ensured that 
notions of morality and law working together to serve justice and the good of society 
would remain a part of the French legal tradition. 45 This conception oflaw as the key 
mechanism for protecting society as a whole is vital to understanding the French 
perception of what law is and what it is supposed to accomplish. In the French 
mindset, law is designed to protect society from the actions of bad individuals, and to 
serve as the guiding principles for one's actions. 
Moreover, like the Roman law, the Canon law took on international aspects. The 
impetus of much of the discussion of international law within the Canon law was, in 
fact, the discovery of the Americas and the concomitant questions about humanity and 
law that occurred upon the discovery of new races of people. As Spanish theologians 
and French philosophers struggled with the task of applying the Canon law to these 
new civilizations around the world, they honed and elaborated principles of the laws 
of nations that had first begun with the Romans. 46 The Spanish theologians Vitoria and 
Las Casas, for example, argued that a law of sovereignty existed which applied to all 
humans, and was inviolable barring a direct attack on one's own person. 47 After 
reading the works of these theologians, Montaigne questioned the wisdom of the 
French government's position on laws and rules concerning the new territories. 
Montaigne's position was later taken up by Rousseau and refined into the Enlighten-
ment principles of liberte, egalite, andfraternite, principles that formed the basis of 
the French Revolution and the legal system that eventually developed from it.48 
As in the case of French law, international law carries with it many foundations, 
including the concepts of morality and justice. Much of international law rests on 
43. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 22-23. 
44. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 39-40; DAWSON, supra note I 3, at 279 (Canon law borrowed 
from the conceptual frameworks and vocabulary of the Roman law, and the connections between the two 
laws were "always close."). 
45. See generally DAWSON, supra note 13; GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7. 
46. See Von Elbe, supra note 31. This debate, which originally centered on the Spanish scholars such 
as Vitoria, Sepulveda, and Las Casas, was incorporated into French dialogue through the writings ofFrench 
thinkers such as Montaigne and Montesquieu. 
47. For an in-depth discussion on the Valladolid Debate of 1550 between Las Casas and Sepulveda, 
including a discussion of Vitoria's and Las Casas' position, see LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR 
JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA (2002) (1949). 
48. See MONTAIGNE, supra note 11, at 228-241 (for his essay 'On the Cannibals'); ROUSSEAU, supra 
note 11. For a more detailed discussion, see Rogoff, supra note 12, at 51-52 ("Rousseau's ideas continue 
to express the feelings of the French toward their fundamental Jaw-which since 1791 has been embodied 
in a succession of written constitutions. The fundamental Jaw must be malleable; it must express the current 
will of the people."). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 351 2006
2006] THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION 351 
general rules designed to guide behavior, so that actions taken by any one state are not 
harmful to the international community as a whole. Many international rules feature 
undertones of morality and a sense of justice, which are akin to the French conceptions 
oflaw and its role. Because the French view oflaw generally has these historical ties, 
the act of understanding and incorporating international law is not particularly foreign 
to the French. 
The period surrounding the French Revolution is a crucial one for both the 
solidification of the foundational principles of the French legal tradition and the 
development of the modern French legal institutions. From the 15th century onward, 
as French scholars were returning from Bologna with new Roman law, the French 
nation was beginning to centralize, creating the need for a uniform French law.49 This 
came, at first, through both royal ordinance and the creation at the end of the 13th 
century of the parlements, "specialized group[ s ]" of men who, "shortly after 1250 
began to hold regular sessions that were primarily devoted to judicial business. "50 In 
theory, the parlements would apply the law fairly to all people. However, in practice, 
they became corrupt and abused their power for the benefit of their members and the 
noble classes. 51 
These actions would ultimately have a profound influence on the development of 
the French legal tradition, and most importantly, on the development of French legal 
institutions after the French Revolution. The reaction to the corruption of the 
parlements has structured the role of the French legal institutions ever since, in such 
a way as to minimize the power of the judicial branch in favor of the legislative, and 
particularly after de Gaulle, the executive branches of the government. 52 The reaction 
also had a great effect on the treatment of international law by France; since that time 
the incorporation of international legal rules, as with the creation of all law, has 
remained primarily within the realms of the non-judicial branches of government. 
Ultimately, the actions of the parlements, coupled with those of the monarchy, led 
to the French Revolution. 53 The Revolution was a turning point in the development of 
the French legal tradition, because it caused a shift in both French institutions-one 
which continued into the 20th century-and the perception of the population of France 
regarding the correct role oflaw in society. Most significantly, the Revolution raised 
awareness among the population as to the government's obligations to the French 
49. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 348. 
50. Id. at 274. For discussion of the history of the parlements, see id. at 273-90 and HIGONNET, supra 
note 24, at 79-80. 
51. DUROSELLE, supra note 7, at 12; DAWSON, supra note 13, at 369. 
52. On the subjugation of the judiciary immediately after the French Revolution, see DAWSON, supra 
note 13, at 375-376 ("The leaders of the French Revolution soon undertook the urgent task of subjugating 
the judiciary."); see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRAomoN: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA 
AND EAST ASIA 447 (1994) ("All the institutions of the ancient regime were rooted out in very short 
order .... In its place was put the vision of the Enlightened Society, as sketched by Diderot, Voltaire, and 
Rousseau: according to this, man is a rational and responsible creature who acquires at birth an inalienable 
right to freedom of conscience, belief, and economic activity."). For a discussion of the integral role 
Generale de Gaulle played in strengthening the Executive branch of the French government at the expense 
of Parliament, see Rogoff, supra note 12, at 63. 
53. For a general discussion on the causes of the French Revolution, see DUROSELLE, supra note 7; 
HIGONNET, supra note 24. 
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people and the state concerning the rule oflaw. 54 In this new French view, the focus 
is on the individual's dependence on civil society such that the goal of law is not so 
much the protection ofindividual rights, but rather the dissemination of rules regarding 
the fundamental duties one owes to the cornmunity. 55 The primary goal oflaw, under 
this conception, is the betterment of all, which takes precedence over protections for 
the individual. 56 
While the underlying values of the French legal tradition remained uncertain 
during the 19th century, the legal institutions which developed post-revolution 
continued to thrive, despite the continuous shift in govemment. 57 The Napoleonic 
Code of 1804,58 drafted under the rule of Napoleon, adopted many of the principles 
found in Justinian's Code while reflecting the political and social revolution. 59 The 
Code incorporates a melange of sources, including Roman law, Canon law, customary 
law, and doctrines established by pre-revolutionary court decisions. 60 It forms the 
heart of French identification with the law and their legal culture, having a ''very 
unique and central role in the French legal system, and even in French culture as a 
whole." 61 The Code remains, in many respects, unchanged today, and still reflects the 
fundamental ideology behind the Code's rules: an ideology based on the belief in law 
54. MERRYMAN, supra note 52, at 443 ("The emphasis on the rights of man in the revolutionary period 
produced statements about individual liberty of the sort found ... in the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen." Examples included the "right of a man to own property" and "the obligation 
of the law to protect his ownership" as well as the "right to conduct his own affairs and to move laterally 
and vertically in society." This was a reaction to ''the tendency under feudalism to fix a man in place and 
status."). For a discussion of the public sentiment rising out of the French Revolution in terms of the role 
of government and its obligations to the citizenry as captured in the writings of Rousseau, see Rogoff, supra 
note 12, at 53-54. 
55. BOYLE, supra note 25, at 65. 
56. See id.; see generally ROUSSEAU, supra note 11 ( calling for the establishment of social duty over 
individual right). It should be noted that after the Revolution, the French people clamored for a centralized 
law that would protect the interests of the people and ensure a functioning society. BOGDAN, supra note 40, 
at 168; GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 52-53. In response, the National Assembly, in the years 
immediately following the Revolution, "made individualism the new pivot of social and economic life." 
HIGONNET, supra note 24, at 2-3. Individual protections, rather than those of society, were seen as the goal 
of the state and the laws. This focus on individualism, however, did not last. The concept of law as a 
protection for all people was subsumed in the re-emergence of totalitarian forms of rule. Four years after 
the Revolution, in fact, Robespierre's rise to power meant that these policies regarding individualism would 
be reversed and individualism restrained. While this restraint started out under the rubric of a better 
government for society as a whole, the result was instead a crackdown on any form of individual liberty or 
any manifestation of the rule of law and a resulting return to "arbitrary, monarchic rule "-an early form 
of modem totalitarianism. Thus, although the French Revolution was initially based on the same principles 
as the American Revolution, unlike the United States-which continued to grow and develop without pause 
based on the cause of individual liberty-France lost the principles of the Revolution rather quickly and they 
did not return to France until a century later. Id. 
57. From the time of the French Revolution in 1789, France has had "two monarchies, two empires, 
and five republics." HIGONNET, supra note 24, at 274. 
58. This consisted of five separate codes: the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Commercial Code. BOGDAN, supra note 40, at 168. 
59. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 53. 
60. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 349. 
61. BOGDAN, supra note 40, at 169. 
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and justice for the community and the common sense of human beings.62 The Napo-
leonic Code provides the basic structure and foundation for the legal institutions 
present in France today, in both the civil and criminal law arenas.63 This body oflaw 
encompassed the historical influences of Roman and Canon law. It then spread 
throughout the French empire begun by Napoleon and continued through the first half 
of the 20th century. Accordingly, today's French code and legal institutions have long 
historical experience with concepts of the law of nations. This historical familiarity 
informs the modern day approach to international law taken by the French. It provides 
both a more ready means of incorporating international law into the domestic law of 
France, and a more ingrained sense among the French people that international law is 
another set of rules designed to protect society and the community as a whole, and is 
thus a form of law to be obeyed. 
B. Legal Institutions 
While important in its own right as the constitutive element of the role oflaw in 
France today, France's particular legal history is also crucial in explaining the French 
treatment of international law because of the legal and political institutions that have 
developed out of this history. The legal tradition in France greatly influenced the 
creation of new political institutions after the French Revolution and continues to 
influence French institutions today. After the Revolution, as the French Republic was 
created, much attention was paid to creating governmental and legal institutions that 
would serve the goals of the people, rather than the goals of the upper classes.64 
Among the most important of these institutional structures are the separation of powers 
and the relative levels of power accorded to the various branches of government in the 
area oflawmaking-whether by enacting domestic law or incorporating international 
law. 
The French government maintains a separation of powers, as do most democratic 
states in the world today.65 However, French institutions, their powers, and the 
separation of these powers have changed periodically since the end of the French 
Revolution. France has experienced a variety of institutional structures since 1789.66 
However, no matter which period of history one considers-from the empire of 
Napoleon to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics-the separation of powers has 
always split the preponderance of the power between the legislative and executive 
62. Id 
63. See DAVID, supra note 5, at vii. 
64. This was ensured by the subordination of the court to the legislature in drawing up post-
Revolutionary separation of powers. See DAWSON, supra note 13, at 374-378; DAVID, supra note 5, at 27 
("Frenchmen have always had some difficulty ... thinking of the courts as exercising a 'power' comparable 
to those exercised by Parliament and the executive"); MERRYMAN, supra note 52, at 44 7 ("The state is 
bound through its legislation to free its citizens from the traditional authority of feudal, church, family, guild, 
and status groups, and to equip all citizens with equal rights.") and at 450 ("Fear of a 'gouvemement des 
juges' hovered over French post-revolutionary reforms and colored the codification process. The emphasis 
on complete separation of powers, with all lawmaking power lodged in a representative legislature, was a 
way of insuring that the judiciary would be denied lawmaking power."). 
65. For a more detailed discussion of the institutions of the French government, see Rogoff, supra note 
12. 
66. See supra note 57. 
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branches, leaving the judicial branch with minimal powers. 67 This institutional 
structure, in turn, affects the incorporation of international law into the domestic law 
of France. 
The French legislature, together with ( since the era of de Gaulle and the creation 
of the Fifth Republic) the French executive, maintains the almost exclusive authority 
to draft and pass new laws. 68 The Executive alone maintains the preponderance of 
power to negotiate and sign foreign treaties binding France to international law.69 In 
turn, because of the heavy emphasis in France on law being made by the representative 
branches of government, the judiciary has a very minimal role in either deciding 
whether an international legal rule is valid in France, or how that rule should be 
applied. 70 
The French judiciary's powers of review are minimal; except for the special role 
of the Constitutional Council, the judiciary does not have the power to declare any act 
of Parliament void. 71 Moreover, the French judiciary has limited powers in deciding 
the cases that come before them. French judges are expected to render their decision 
based strictly on interpretation of existing codes and statutes. 72 They, generally, do not 
have the authority to make law with judicial decisions, but must instead interpret the 
law as made by the legislature. 73 This role for the French judiciary is rooted in the 
population's history of resentment of judicial abuses prior to the Revolution. 74 
Traditionally, the judiciary in France, as members of the upper class and often servants 
of the king, were seen as unjust in their decision-making. 75 Prior to the French 
67. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 83; MERRYMAN, supra note 52, at 450. 
68. See generally Martin A. Rogoff, The French (R)Evolution OJ 1958-1998, 3 CoLUM. J. EUR. L. 453 
(1997-98). 
69. 1958 CONST. 52-53. 
70. For a discussion of the changes that have occurred in the French institutional structure since the 
enactment of the 1958 Constitution, see generally Rogoff, supra note 68. There are instances where the 
French courts have taken the initiative in determining whether or not a particular international rule is valid 
as French law, or how to interpret an international legal rule. These cases have come most often over the 
past fifty years in the form of decisions over France's obligations as a member of the European Union. See, 
for example, the Cafe Jacques Vabre (1975) case in which the French Cour de Cassation determined that 
French Courts, in accordance with European Union law, could make determinations on the validity of 
legislative provisions under French treaty obligations. This decision essentially provided French courts with 
a modicum of judicial review over state actions in terms of compliance with international law, but did not 
extend this review to conformity with the French Constitution. See Cafe Jacques Vabre, Cass. ch. mixte, 
May 24, 1975, D.1975.497, reprinted in FRAN<;OIS TERRE & YVES LEQUETIE, LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA 
JURISPRUDENCE CMLE 15 ( 1994). 
71. The French Constitutional Council may review a law, prior to the law's enactment, to ensure 
conformity with the Constitution: "Institutional Acts, before their promulgation, and the rules of procedure 
of the parliamentary assemblies, before their entry into force, must be referred to the Constitutional Council, 
which shall rule on their conformity with the Constitution." 1958 CONST. 61. 
72. DAVID& BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 122-23. 
73. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 392 ("Law-making was not for the judiciary or the executive; it was 
entirely reserved for the legislature. From this monopoly of the law-making function it seemed to follow 
that the only worthy subject of the interpreter's attention was code or statute, duly invested of the legislator's 
sanction."). 
74. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 82-83. 
75. DA YID, supra note 5, at 11 ("The chief reason for undertaking codification and carrying it through 
to completion was practical. The diversity of customary law and the overall lack of uniformity in French 
law could no longer be justified" post-Revolution.). See also DA YID, supra note 5, at 23 (stating that the 
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Revolution,judges were widely seen as a tool of the wealthy, used to keep the masses 
subjugated. 76 Judgeships in France were often passed through noble families or made 
available for sale to the highest bidder. 77 
The French Revolution resulted in very different roles for judges. 78 Although 
judges, as the original center of opposition to the authoritarian government, were 
actually responsible for the instigation of the French Revolution, from the days of the 
Revolution forward they have been held in a state of distrust. 79 Accordingly, when the 
post-Revolution French legal system was created, the judiciary received very little 
power. 80 To the extent that the French believe law exists to protect and serve the 
people of the country as a whole (i.e., to ensure a good society), 81 they believe that the 
making of law should be left to the legislature or the President (as the elected, 
representative body of the people), and should not be in the hands of the judiciary (as 
a non-elected body of government employees who have no responsibility to the 
population as a whole). 
France is also a monist system in terms of the incorporation of international law 
into the domestic legal structure. 82 Once ratified by the Executive or National 
Assembly, the treaty becomes law in France without further execution necessary by 
the government. 83 Moreover, neither the legislature nor the courts have the authority 
to alter the provisions of the treaty through reservations or understandings. 84 This 
means that treaties, once ratified by the French government, become law in France on 
par with, and treated the same as, domestic law.85 This streamlined process for 
parlements "made themselves very unpopular" through their defense of "an antiquated system based on the 
inequality of social classes and on self-serving premises"). 
76. Id 
77. Moreover, "since the normal turnover (of judgeships] through death or resignation did not bring in 
money fast enough, new judgeships and other offices were created .... " DAWSON, supra note 13, at 352. 
78. Id. at 370. 
79. Id. 
80. See generally 2 HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 551 (2002). 
81. "Le but de la societe est le bonheur commun. " Constitution du 24 juin 1793 Declaration des droits 
de l'homme et du citoyen (I 795). For a discussion of how French judges maintain a different attitude 
towards international law, see BOYLE, supra note 25. 
82. Pierre Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 13 (Monroe Leigh & Merritt R. Blakeslee eds. 1995). For a 
discussion of monism versus dualism, see ANTHONY D'AMATO, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW COURSEBOOK 
ch. II (1997). 
83. Eisemann & Kessedjian, supra note 82, at 13. 
84. Id. 
85. Article 53 of the French Constitution of I 958 provides for when treaties require ratification by 
Parliament versus ratification by act of the President: 
Peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties or agreements relating to international 
organization, those that commit the finances of the State, those that modify provisions which 
are matters for statute, those relating to the status of persons, and those that involve the 
cession, exchange or addition of territory, may be ratified or approved only by virtue of an 
Act of Parliament. 
1958 CONST. 53. Further, Article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958 states: "Treaties or agreements duly 
ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in regard to each 
agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party." 1958 CONST. 55. 
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ratification and publication, combined with the potential for the French public's direct 
participation in the treaty process through public referendum 86 and the great public 
interest in France's position regarding international law,87 facilitates the recognition 
and incorporation of international law into the French legal system. 
C. Sources of Law, Interpretation, and Change 
Closely related to the physical legal institutions that have developed in France out 
of the French legal tradition are the sources of law these legal institutions tum to in 
order to define the appropriate standards of behavior. As judges themselves are not 
involved in the making oflaw on a case-by-case basis, the recognized sources oflaw 
become all the more important for determining what the legal rules actually are.88 
Moreover, it is important to examine the explicit position given to international law in 
the French legal structure, as the ease with which international legal rules can become 
binding on the French population as a whole determines the framework in which 
government decisions are taken regarding French action in the international system. 
In France, as with both the Roman law and the Canon law, one of the primary 
sources oflaw has historically been the writings oflegal scholars and jurists. 89 While 
this diminished slightly in importance during the latter part of the 20th century, 90 the 
publications of eminent legal scholars on various legal subfields are still relied on by 
the legislature in drafting new law and by the judiciary in interpreting law.91 They are 
regarded as authoritative indicators of both the current state of the law and the 
perceptions and preferences of the French population concerning the law.92 This is 
especially true in terms ofinternational law, a branch oflaw which has long been the 
realm of legal scholars as opposed to legislators. 93 Legal scholarship plays a 
significant role in providing French jurists and lawmakers with an assessment of the 
Id. 
86. 1958 CONST. 11. 
The President of the Republic may, on a proposal from the Government when Parliament is 
in session or on a joint motion of the two assemblies, published in either case in the Journal 
officiel, submit to a referendum any government bill which ... provides for authorization to 
ratify a treaty that, although not contrary to the Constitution, would affect the functioning 
of the institutions. 
87. See discussion infra Part 11.D. 
88. See supra note 70. 
89. See DAVID&BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 134; DAVID, supra note 5, at ix. While in the early days 
of the Roman legal system laws were made on a case-by-case basis, by the tum of the millennium these 
decisions of the jurisconsults began to be codified in written volumes, which were eventually synthesized 
into the Corpus Juris Civilis. On the history of Roman law, see supra notes 36-38. 
90. See DAVID& BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 134; GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 210. 
91. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 134; GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 210. 
92. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 210 ("[T)he importance of the academics' function in presenting 
analyses of cases and statutes to judges and lawyers is hard to overestimate."). For a brief discussion of the 
role of scholarly opinion in the broader legal system see DAVID, supra note 5, at 80-81. 
93. See generally MALcOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (5th ed. 2003) ("Historically ... the 
influence of academic writers on the development of international law has been marked."); MARK JANIS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TOINTERNATIONAL LA w 80 (3rd ed. 1999) ("[T]he doctrines of scholars have played a 
surprisingly important part in the development of international law."). 
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various issues in foreign jurisdictions and international law, and informs the public as 
to the international legal rules to which their state is bound. 
As a result of these academic roots, the civil law tradition in France developed 
with a much deeper focus on ''the systematic, philosophical, and structural side of the 
law."94 In fact, in conformity with history, the civil law tradition remains a system that 
can be described as a jurist's law.95 International law originated as a law of scholars, 
and the close relation the French legal tradition has to these writings facilitates even 
today its incorporation of these historical international law ideas and their modem 
descendants into French law.96 
For the French lawyer, jurist, or layperson, la loi, referring to the detailed rules 
which society must follow, coexists with le droit, referring to the broader concept of 
the law as an ideal and guiding principle for society. While the idealized concepts of 
le droit have never been entirely adopted as concrete rules, la loi-that which comes 
from the legislature and the executive--has never been regarded by scholars or the 
general population as the true law.97 This understanding of the law, so different from 
a common law understanding by which the law is a single entity stemming from the 
work of the courts, is a core component of the entire French legal tradition. It forms 
the foundation of not only the French understanding of the sources oflaw, but also the 
public perception of how law is designed to function in and for society. It follows that 
France "place[s] case law far down on the scale among available sources oflaw." 98 
In addition to the sources of law themselves, the actual methods of interpretation 
used by scholars, judges, and others influence the way in which a state approaches 
international law. Modes of legal reasoning include formal versus pragmatic, 
deductive versus inductive, and abstract versus contextual. 99 These different modes 
provide different methods ofinterpretation and application of the law. In France, legal 
interpreters use deductive reasoning, in which the responsibility of the judge is to 
apply general principles already in existence to specific facts without unique interpre-
tation or the creation of new law.100 Although these differences may seem subtle, they 
play a significant role in how law is created and perceived in the different legal 
94. Alan Watson, supra note 22, at 1131. 
95. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 98. 
96. Modem international law stems directly from the work of European scholars working between the 
15th and 18th centuries, including Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, and Kant. These works form 
a canon of legal scholarship and theory studied by Continental lawyers, but often ignored by their common 
law counterparts. For a discussion of the role of the scholar in French law and international law, see supra 
notes 92 and 93. For a discussion of the historical origins of international law, see generally Von Elbe, supra 
note 31; see also SHAW, supra note 93, at 12-30. 
97. DAVID, supra note 5, at ix. 
98. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 374; DAVID, supra note 5, at ix. It should be noted, however, that the 
use of case law as a source of law is becoming more common in France. See generally Rogoff, supra note 
68; see also GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7. 
99. See Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructing the European Community Legal System 
from the Ground Up: The Role of Individual Litigants in National Courts (Jean Monnet Work Papers Series, 
No. 6, 1996), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9606ind.htm1. 
100. For a more general discussion of methods of interpretation in France and the United States see 
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMP ARA TNE APPROACH TO THE 
LEGAL PROCESS (1986); Mirjan R. Dam~ka, Reflections on American Constitutionalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 421 (Supp. 1990). See generally GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7. 
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traditions. A country like France would rarely countenance the application of a new 
legal rule prior to its being promulgated by the law-making body (in domestic law, the 
Parliament; in international law, the international community under the rubric of the 
United Nations). Moreover, the French see law as an elemental force in their 
society, 101 so it can be difficult to change, in the sense that it is always more difficult 
to change foundations than outer structures. The law can be changed, of course, but 
this change must come through an amendment to existing code provisions or statute, 
rather than through judicial decision. 102 Although seemingly the operation of the 
French legal system does not operate at any slower pace than that of the United States, 
the underlying philosophy about sources oflaw, interpretation, and change in the law 
does, I suggest, have an effect on the approach France takes towards international law. 
D. Public Perception of the Role of Law 
The role of the public in the approach of a state to international law is also 
important to consider, especially in democracies where the government is responsible 
to the people for the laws, and the people will use their perception of laws and their 
role in society to judge the appropriateness of state action according to their 
historically-developed notions of justice. 103 Legal rules are rooted in social norms and 
values, and the legal tradition frames the notions of what a society believes is just. 
What people think about the law and the values embedded therein has much to do with 
how they behave, as well as significant consequences for the larger political and legal 
systems. In general, attitudes toward the rule of law likely influence a people's 
willingness to comply with the law.104 France provides an illustration of how this 
mechanism works. 
As mentioned above, law in France has long been a communal endeavor. 105 
Students are educated in law from an early age, and the public participation in the 
development of French law is substantial. As the French legal scholar Rene David has 
stated, "Among the peoples of Europe the French probably hold law in the greatest 
esteem. " 106 By way of example, issues of legal structure and judicial fairness played 
IOI. DAVID, supra note 5, at 75. 
I 02. For example, if France has ratified an international treaty, but it is determined by the Constitutional 
Council that the treaty may contradict an existing provision of the French Constitution, then rather than the 
Court providing a legal interpretation of the treaty, the Constitution must be amended before the treaty 
provisions officially enter into force. The French Constitution states: 
If the Constitutional Council, on a reference from the President of the Republic, from the 
Prime Minister, from the President of one or the other assembly, or from sixty deputies or 
sixty senators, has declared that an international commitment contains a clause contrary to 
the Constitution, authorization to ratify or approve the international commitment in question 
may be given only after amendment of the Constitution. 
1958 CONST. 54. 
103. For a discussion of the logic of appropriateness concerning state action, see James G. March & 
Johan P. Olson, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998); 
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 
887 (1998). 
104. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 27. 
105. See supra notes 55-56. 
106. DAVID, supra note 5, at 75. 
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a key role alongside rights and freedoms in the French Revolution. 107 Moreover, from 
the beginning ofNapoleon's attempts to codify French law, public elementary schools 
were charged with providing rudimentary lectures on law, not for the purpose of 
creating new lawyers or judges, but in order to create "virtuous citizens" by giving 
children an understanding of the role oflaw. 108 Napoleon also ordered the creation of 
ten new law schools, bringing the study of law back into importance after decades of 
disrespect. 109 In France, law is "not simply a matter for lawyers." 110 A general 
knowledge of the law is highly valued, and an understanding oflaw and legal history 
is considered "an almost essential element" of a well-rounded education. 111 Law is 
historically seen as superior to politics-perhaps a reflection of the idealistic view of 
le droit which places justice above politics. 112 
This extensive French involvement with the law as part of the course of everyday 
life means that the French public plays a large role in the French attitude towards 
international law as well. The French population, having long experience with 
international relations and the importance of international law, remains active in 
ensuring that the actions of the French government incorporate the popular will on 
international legal issues, whether it be ratifying a human rights treaty, rejecting the 
European Constitution, or staying out of Iraq. Regarding the last of these issues, 
Europeans in general, and perhaps the French in particular, see little in their long 
experience to support the notion that force and occupation can bring democracy to the 
Arab world. 113 This historical pessimism, combined with an extensive and devastating 
experience with war, helps foster France's reluctance to embrace new visions of pre-
emptive intervention. 114 
107, See HIGONNET, supra note 24. 
108. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 386. 
109. Id. at 387. 
I 10. DAVID, supra note 5, at ix. 
ll I. Id. at 51, 73. 
112. Id. at ix. 
113. Justin Vaisee, Making Sense of French Foreign Policy, in IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST (July 2, 
2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu. 
114. Id. A global survey has revealed that Europeans and Americans do share similar views as to the 
biggest threats to global security: international terrorism; North Korea's and Iran's access to weapons of 
mass destruction; Islamic fundamentalism; and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These similarities closely track 
statements made by the two governments over their shared goals for Iraq. However, Europeans and 
Americans sharply disagree, as do their leaders, over the use of military force to deal with global threats. 
Approximately 84 percent of Americans have said war may be used to achieve justice, while only 48 percent 
of Europeans agree, and 78 percent of Europeans, compared with 67 percent of Americans, believe U.S. 
unilateralism poses a possible international threat over the next ten years. And while both groups support 
strengthening the United Nations, 57 percent of Americans are prepared to bypass the world organization 
when vital interests are at stake, while only about 40 percent of Europeans say they would do so. Glenn 
Frankel, Poll: Opposition to U.S. Policy Grows In Europe, WASH. POST. Sept. 4, 2003 at A 15. These figures 
reflect the different perceptions the French and the Americans maintain towards international law, 
particularly in terms of the United States' willingness to push the boundaries of definition of anticipatory 
intervention. The French view on the matter supported the ultimate French position-a position, as 
discussed here, that reflects many of the components of the historical French legal tradition and 
institutions-that the best course of action to take in regards to Iraq was to continue diplomatic negotiations 
through the United Nations, adhering to existing understanding of the laws of intervention that required a 
threat of imminent attack. 
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Contrary to the development of the French legal tradition, the legal tradition of the 
United States developed in isolation, only tangentially tied to the English common law 
upon which it was founded. 115 The first English settlers to North America brought with 
them, by judicial decree, English common law.116 The common law of England at the 
time of the founding of the United States was a very different system of law than was 
in place in France. Although England, like France, was a monarchy, a centralized 
judicial system had been in place since the reign of William the Conqueror in the 11th 
century. 117 William created in England a system oflaws and courts-available to all 
citizens of England, and featuring the use of writs and the operation of a centralized 
court structure which culminated in an appeal directly to the King-which still remains 
much the same today. Furthermore, England was geographically isolated from the rest 
of continental Europe. This kept it predominantly free from outside influence, 
including that of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. As a result, early 
English legal development centered on a body of case law built through judicial 
decisions, and was seen primarily as a means of solving disputes. 118 This meant that 
legal cases centered on the specifics of each dispute as outlined in each available form 
of action, rather than on general principles of justice. 119 This fundamental difference 
in the approach to law between common law states such as the United States, and civil 
law states such as France, forms the core basis for the different approaches the two 
states take to international law. The manner in which law is created and applied in the 
two countries-through case decision in the United States and through written doctrine 
in France-ties the historical development of each legal tradition to the modem view 
oflaw and determines the ease with which international law is viewed as a part of the 
modem legal system. 
Despite the rejection of many English institutional structures by the United States 
colonists, the English system of law creation which centered on judicial decision and 
dispute resolution proved to be useful for the new colonies, due to its flexibility and 
scalability. 120 However, American legal culture was based not on a sovereign 
authority, but instead on freedom and independence, in keeping with the American 
colonists' perception of what the role oflaw should be in their new society. 121 Thus, 
115. DA YID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 375. 
116. This was decreed by English judicial decision in Calvin ·s Case, 7 Co. Rep. I a, 77 Eng. Rep. 3 77 
(1608). English subjects carry with them the common law of England when they settle in new lands that are 
not already under control of civilized nations. This applies unless circumstances in the new territory are 
such that the English common law cannot be adapted to local institutions and circumstances. See DA YID & 
BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 369. 
117. For a general discussion of English legal history see DAVID&BRIERLEY, supra note 36; GLENDON, 
ET AL., supra note 7; S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTHE COMMON LAW, Butterworth & 
Co. (1981); R.C. VANCAENEGEM, THEBIRTHOFENGLISHCOMMONLAW(2d ed. 1989). 
I 18. DAVID, supra note 5, at 73. 
119. Id. 
120. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 40. 
121. Id. at 41; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 369-70. 
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rather than rely on the body of case law built within the royal courts in England, the 
colonists set up their own court structure, with new courts which could refer to English 
law but whose primary mission was to create their own laws which identified with the 
spirit of the new country. 122 These ideals were reinforced by both the American 
Revolution and the founding documents of the new nation (the Declaration of 
Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights). 
In this way, the legal tradition of the United States developed based on the goal 
of protecting individual rights above all else, combined with a definitive separation of 
powers and a provision of power for the judiciary. 123 Each of these components, to 
some extent, contradicts those characteristics that formed the early French legal 
tradition. 124 The American legal system that emerged out of the American Revolution, 
and the focus on republican ideals, led to the development of unique institutions which 
were unlike any that would develop in Europe for at least another 100 years. 125 This, 
coupled with the general perception of the young United States as being "exceptional" 
-as having a "Manifest Destiny"-led to both an institutional development and a 
public perception of the role of law in society that differed greatly from that of 
France. 126 The United States legal culture that developed in the early 19th century saw 
law as a dynamic, rather than static, tool of the masses that could be used to "harness 
the energy" latent in the new republic. 127 
Although the founders of the United States were, like the French, children of the 
Enlightenment, the works of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau took on a different 
meaning in the United States, largely due to geography and circumstance. In the 
United States, Locke's belief that man creates civil society for the purpose of 
protecting individual rights such as life, liberty, and property formed the foundations 
of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. 128 By focusing on the views of Locke 
regarding civil society, rather than the views of Rousseau (which were so influential 
in France), the American people adopted as their mantra a focus on individualism. In 
this paradigm, law must exist to order society, but this order comes through the 
protection of the interests of the individual rather than the community. 129 
After the Revolution, between 1776 and 1787, Americans moved to "forge a new 
political consciousness that resolved the tensions of their historical experience," 
reconciling it with their unique position as a new state. 130 America became 
122. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 40-41. 
123. Id. at 122. 
124. As discussed above, although initially the laws post-revolution in France were based on the same 
individualistic foundations as in the United States, within four short years this had been reversed as the 
promise of a republic of the people gave way once again to authoritarian rule. 
125. DAVID& BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 371; CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN QUEST 12 (1971). 
126. HIGONNET, supra note 24. 
127. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 114; Rogoff, supra note 12, at 38 ("The dominant ideology in the 
United States is that each person can advance to the full extent of his talents and ambition. The principal 
function of government is the protection of this liberty of individual action."); for a more general discussion 
of the development of the United States during the 18th and 19th centuries, see ROSSITER, supra note 12S. 
128. BOYLE, supra note 25; for Locke's discussion see LOCKE, supra note 11, at 318. 
129. For further discussion of Locke's influence see BOYLE, supra note 25, at 64-65. 
130. HIGONNET, supra note 24, at 4-S. 
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"fundamentally individualistic" in its social forms. 131 This belief has persisted to the 
present day, providing remarkable consistency in the American tradition. Rooted in 
essentially a single source, and developing from a single set of principles outlined by 
the American Revolution, the United States' legal tradition has maintained both its 
basic tenets and its basic institutional structure since the end of the 18th century. This 
consistency has also provided invariance with respect to the United States' approach 
to international law. Notwithstanding occasional idiosyncrasies due to the personality 
traits of particular presidents, the United States has maintained a fairly consistent view 
of international law since its inception. While the United States supports the rules of 
international law as essential components of a just society, it also commonly works 
within the international legal system in order to push the boundaries oflegality so that 
it can pursue its individual interests, just as individuals commonly resort to American 
courts to advance their own causes. 132 To maintain that stare decisis can be trumped 
by the presence of new facts is a quintessential American legal pastime, and for the 
United States, the Iraq situation post-9/l l provided a sterling example of the 
applicability of this stratagem. 
B. Legal Institutions 
The legal institutions that have developed in the United States, also stemming 
from the time of the American Revolution, further support this approach. Like the 
development of the French legal institutions, the U.S. system began with the division 
of powers among different branches of government. 133 Unlike the French system, 
however, the powers separated in the United States included substantial powers for the 
judiciary, including the power of judicial review. 134 The Court's assumption of the 
power to review the actions of the other branches of government is a clear illustration 
of the different roles of the judiciary in the United States and France. French courts 
131. Id. 
132. The United States is a behemoth with a conscience .... Americans do not argue, even to 
themselves, that their actions may be justified by raison d'etat. They do not claim the right 
of the stronger or insist to the rest of the world, as the Athenians did at Metos, that "the 
strong rule where they can and the weak suffer what they must." Americans have never 
accepted the principles of Europe's old order .... The United States is a liberal, progressive 
society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe 
it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world 
order. Americans even share Europe's aspirations for a more orderly world system based 
not on power but on rules-after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans 
were still extolling the Jaws of Machtpolitik. But while these common ideals and aspirations 
shape foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very 
different perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world. 
KAGAN, supra note I, at 41-42. 
133. For a general discussion of the development of U.S. institutions see DAMASKA, supra note 100 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7. See also HIGONNET, supra note 24. 
134. Of course, this latter power was not explicitly granted in the Constitution of the United States, but 
was determined to belong to the Supreme Court through the Court's own judicial decision. Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (I 803) (concluding that the United States Supreme Court had the power 
to declare a statute void that it considered repugnant to the Constitution, and legally establishing the 
judiciary-and in particular, the Supreme Court-as an equal partner among the three branches of the 
American federal government). 
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do not have such power, and indeed are unlikely to even interpret themselves as having 
the authority to possess a power of judicial review on a widespread basis. U.S. courts, 
on the other hand, are in the business of making law, and in making law they have 
been able to assert for themselves additional power to share control of the legal 
agenda. 135 Of course, in the United States, Congress and the executive have the power 
to draft and pass legislation. 136 But the power of the Supreme Court to at any time 
declare legislation incompatible with the principles of the Constitution alters the legal 
structure within society. As the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the appropriate 
interpretation of the Constitution, so ultimately judicial decision remains the primary 
source of law in the United States. 
This system of separation of powers within the United States, and the correspond-
ing roles granted to each political institution, have had a significant effect on the 
manner in which the United States approaches international law. The Senate advise-
and-consent procedure required by the U.S. Constitution prior to treaty ratification 137 
has often made such ratification subject to the political whims of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Obtaining a two-thirds majority vote to consent to a treaty 
frequently becomes the subject of a low-level political game in a way that is not 
possible in France. This political maneuvering over incorporation ofinternational law 
into the U.S. domestic legal framework is primarily a function of the historical 
individualism and isolation the United States has adopted as a foreign policy stance; 
interference with U.S. ideals by outside sources is generally not welcome. 138 In turn 
this has contributed to a lower interest in international law and international relations 
among the American public than their French counterparts, which accordingly puts 
lesser impetus on the incorporation of international legal norms into the domestic legal 
structure of the United States. 139 
An additional institutional component of the United States that affects the 
country's approach to international law is that of the U.S. federal system. Although 
states on their own do not have the authority to enter into international treaties or bind 
themselves or the United States to international agreements, the power of states to 
make their own laws and structure their own judicial systems plays a role in how easily 
international law can be incorporated into the domestic law of the United States. 140 
135. LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION {2d ed. 1996). See also FALK. 
supra note 25. 
136. U.S. CONST., art. I,§§ 7-8. 
137. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In the United States, the advice and consent procedure proceeds as 
follows: Once a treaty has been signed by the President or his representative, the Senate, by a two-thirds 
majority, must pass a resolution of"advice and consent." In this way, the Senate, which has no authority 
during negotiation, can essentially freeze U.S. action on a treaty or dilute the treaty's terms through the 
addition of reservations and understandings. 
138. Rogoff, supra note 12, at 26-27. 
139. Many of the more controversial treaties signed by the United States have "gathered dust for 
decades" within the annals of the Senate. For example, it took four decades for the United States to ratify 
the UN Convention on Genocide, and the United States and Somalia remain the only two countries in the 
world that have failed to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted in 1989. 
Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Gives Cold Shoulder to Treaties, L.A. TIMES, March 13, 2005, at A22. 
140. For a discussion of the historical relationship between the states and international law, see HENKIN, 
supra note 13 5. 
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Not only do international laws have to pass muster among the members of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches at the federal level, they also must 
overcome any objection at the state level. 141 
Thus, on the one hand, it can be difficult to incorporate international legal 
principles into the domestic legal foundations of the United States, due to a 
combination of institutional structural resistance and indifferent public attitudes 
towards international law. On the other hand, because of both the historical 
"pioneering spirit" of the United States and the country's common law belief in the 
adaptation oflaw to changing circumstances on a case-by-case basis, the United States 
has traditionally been in the forefront of the development of new international legal 
norms. 
C. Sources of Law, Interpretation, and Change 
The sources of law are also significantly different in the United States than they 
are in France. This has had a profound effect on the incorporation and institutionaliza-
tion of international legal principles into United States domestic law. _ 
Although Congress is responsible for passing legislation that is considered the 
law across the United States, the supreme law of the land in the United States remains 
the Constitution. 142 Unlike France, where an entire section of the Constitution of 1958 
is devoted to international treaties and their role as law in France, the U.S. Constitution 
has but one clause relating to international law. 143 This treatment of treaties in the 
Constitution, coupled with subsequent interpretation by the three branches of 
government, has placed international law in a different position in the United States 
than in France. Whereas in France, treaties are held in high regard as a source of 
written law, the United States has a historical skepticism concerning the power of 
treaties as a form of law. 144 Even though the Constitution declares treaties to be the 
supreme law of the land, in practice, the United States government has taken a dualist 
approach to international law, meaning that any international agreement that the United 
141. An example of the influence states can have can be seen in the issue of the death penalty. In the 
United States, primary responsibility for institution of the death penalty is left to the states. The United 
States has not signed on to a number of international treaties that prohibit the death penalty, or has inserted 
reservations as to treaty clauses on the death penalty, due in large part to political pressure by states that 
wish to maintain the death penalty as a form of punishrnenL 
142. Rogoff, supra note 12, at 32. 
143. "Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST., art. VI,§ 2. 
144. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, No. 15 at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961): 
[T]hey were scarcely formed before they were broken, given an instructive but afflicting 
lesson to mankind how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other 
sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of 
peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion. 
But see THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing in support of both 
the proposed method of treaty ratification and on making treaties the supreme law of the land). This 
disparity highlights one of the key differences between France and the United States. Whereas France has 
long historical ties to the development of international law and international legal theorists, the United States 
has taken very little part in the scholarly discussion that took place on the continent, and has very little legal 
scholarship of its own to clarify the position of the founders on international law. See supra note 31. 
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States does ratify is not automatically incorporated into the panoply of domestic laws 
upon publication. 145 Rather, in the U.S., such instruments are generally held to be non-
self-executing, and thus must be enacted into U.S. law through additional 
Congressional legislation. 146 
Moreover, in contrast to the French tradition, rarely in the history of United States 
law have the writings oflegal scholars or general legal doctrine been used as a source 
of law.147 Nor have the moral precepts of religion been allowed to pervade (at least 
overtly) U.S. courtrooms. Historically, United States law adheres to judicial decision-
making as its primary source of law, followed by statutory law as a relatively distant 
second. Because of this limited collection of sources of law, the law in the United 
States is able to be more adaptable because new law is primarily formed out of judicial 
decision. At the same time, however, the institutional structures of the U.S. legal 
system make the incorporation of international law into the sources of law in the 
United States extremely difficult (even where it is desired) and subject to political 
games. 
Because the sources of law in the United States are limited, and because 
international treaties rarely make it out of the Senate (if they make it to the Senate at 
all, and even if they do, they must be executed through additional legislation), 
international law rarely becomes a part of the U.S. legal fabric and is not considered 
an important source for use in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 148 Occasionally a justice 
will point to foreign or international law in support of his or her position, but the 
reference is invariably as a supporting reference, not as binding authority. 149 
Furthermore, those on the U.S. Supreme Court who adhere to the "original intent" 
mode of Constitutional interpretation are even less likely to find international law 
persuasive. 150 
Id. 
145. See Kirgis, supra note 20. 
146. Id. 
Provisions in treaties and other international agreements are given effect as law in domestic 
courts of the United States only if they are "self-executing" or if they have been implemented 
by an act (such as an act of Congress) having the effect offederal law. Courts in this country 
have been reluctant to find such provisions self-executing .... 
147. DAVID& BRIERLEY, supra note 36. 
148. See HENKIN, supra note 135; Eisemann and Kessedjian, supra note 82; Kirgis, supra note 20. See 
also supra note 15 and accompanying text. But see Martin A. Rogoff, lnterpretation OJ International 
Agreements By Domestic Courts And The Politics Oflntemational Treaty Relations: Reflections On Some 
Recent Decisions OJ The United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. INT'LL.&POL'Y 559 (1996). !tis true 
that there have been times throughout U.S. history where the Supreme Court has been more active in 
incorporating public international law into its judicial decisions. In the context of the body of U.S. case law, 
these cases are few and far between, and throughout the 20th century the use of international legal principles 
as legal grounds for judicial decision has become even more infrequent. For a contemporary discussion of 
these views see A Conversation between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance Of Foreign Legal 
Materials Jn U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia And Justice Stephen 
Breyer, INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005). 
149. For a recent example of Supreme Court Justices referring to international norms, see Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
150. See supra note 145. 
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On the other hand, because new law is made as situations happen-as cases come 
before the courts-the United States has a history of pushing the envelope and making 
new arguments where the law is concerned. Those skills are what U.S. jurists are 
taught in law school, and that is how the advancement of law is carried out. If a new 
argument works, then the new principles enter the realm of law as precedent. If the 
argument works repeatedly across the nation, it often becomes codified in legislation. 
This mirrors the approach of the United States where international law is concerned: 
act first, then argue consequences later. While the French will take the very 
generalized rules of international law and see them as binding rules, those in the 
United States regard these international law concepts as having less the authority of 
rules and more the character of general expressions towards which one should 
work-lacking sufficient specificity for one to believe they are absolutely binding. 151 
D. Public Perception of the Role of Law 
Finally, we must consider the role the American public plays in the approach of 
the United States to international law. When surveyed about the most pressing 
concerns on which the United States needs to be focused, Americans consistently aver 
that domestic concerns trump foreign policy issues. 152 Only during war-time, including 
recently, post-9/11, have foreign policy issues surfaced as important areas of concern 
for the American public. 153 Predictably, these concerns relate not to international law 
and the legality ofU .S. actions but instead to terrorist threats and U.S. soldiers fighting 
a war. 154 In contrast, where compliance with international treaties or other obligations 
is concerned, the U.S. public plays a very small role, and puts very little pressure on 
the Senate or the executive to ensure ratification. This is not due solely to the 
institutional structure of the treaty ratification process; it is also due to the lack of 
interest by the American population at large in issues of international law.155 
151. See DAVID, supra note 5, at 79 (highlighting the example of articles 146, which states that "(t]here 
is no marriage when there is no consent," and 180, which states that "[a] marriage contracted without the 
free consent of both spouses, or, of one of them, can only be attacked by such parties themselves, or by the 
one whose consent was not free," which are very general). According to David, "Frenchmen are not 
shocked by the generality of these articles and find that they contain perfectly ordinary legal rules." Id. In 
a common law system like the United States, however, these rules would be considered too vague, and the 
only real rules would come with judicial decisions deciding the specific errors concerning whether the 
"nationality, health, chastity, or criminal record of one of the spouses is, or is not, a grounds for the nullity 
of the marriage." Id. To David, it is a serious problem that in the United States, judges have become 
exceedingly reluctant to interpret rules of international law, and that in many cases, the legislative and 
executive branches do not even give them the opportunity. 
152. See generally THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GLOBAL VIEWS 2004: AMERICAN 




155. For a general discussion of the ambivalence Americans have historically shown towards issues of 
foreign affairs, see P. Terrence Hoppman, French Perspectives on International Relations after the Cold 
War, 38 MERSHON INT'L STUDIES REV. 69 (1994). Given the current general apathy towards the conduct 
of foreign affairs, it should come as no surprise that the ability of the American people to either evaluate or 
participate in this realm of politics has been a subject of inquiry since de Tocqueville's time. See DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11 ( observing that American society is too ill-informed and too fickle to make 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 367 2006
2006] THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION 367 
The roots of this ambivalence can be seen in the historical legal tradition of the 
United States. Developing in relative isolation, under its own unique brand of the 
common law tradition, the population of the United States as a whole has developed 
a view of the law as a tool to assist individual citizens to solve their grievances and 
problems. Law is not seen as a remedy for society's ills, nor is law seen as the moral 
compass for societal good. Law and morality have long been kept separate in U.S. 
jurisprudence. This paradigm, coupled with the protection of individual interests that 
has remained the focus of U.S. legal development, helps to create a public not 
particularly interested in the broader, societal themes that generally make up 
international law. It is, therefore, not that the United States seeks to disregard the rules 
ofinternational law, nor that the people of the United States do not care if their country 
abides by these rules. Instead, the incorporation of an international rule into the 
domestic law of the United States simply becomes a more difficult task, given both the 
United States' historical relationship with international law and the institutional 
structures present there. Moreover, given the way the development oflaw progresses 
in the United States, pushing the boundaries of international law is perceived as 
perfectly natural. 
V. LEGAL TRADIDON AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Ultimately, what does this examination of the legal traditions of France and the 
United States tell us about the behavior of the two states in relation to international 
law? Does this provide us with a basis for addressing the differences between the two 
states that might facilitate agreement, or at least mutual understanding, in the future? 
This essay has considered the effects legal traditions and the legal system that 
developed out of them have on the ways in which the United States and France 
approach international law. Law, by its very nature, is designed to provide guidance 
for actions, whether they be the actions of individuals or states. While other 
institutional components of domestic systems have been examined in relation to their 
ability to affect compliance with international law, 156 most international relations 
scholarship has shied away from an examination oflegal traditions, legal systems, or 
legal institutions. 157 The role oflegal tradition and legal systems has been alluded to 
in several recent pieces but never empirically studied in either international relations 
or international law. 158 Given that the law often forms the third in the triumvirate of 
reasonable judgments). 
156. One example of such an explanation is regime type. A number of studies have been done examining 
whether a state's regime type (i.e. democratic, partially-democratic, authoritarian, monarchical) determines 
its treatment of international law. Results of these studies have generally suggested that democracies are 
more likely to recognize international law than other forms of regime. However, this does not provide an 
explanation for the different positions of France and the United States, as both are advanced, industrial 
democracies with strong commitment to the rule oflaw. It is because of this discrepancy that the underlying 
historical development and values concerning law ultimately may play the decisive role in determining a 
state's treatment of international law. ANDREW p. CORTELL & JAMES w. DA VIS, JR., UNDERSTANDING THE 
DOMESTIC IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS: A RESEARCH AGENDA (2000); Andrew Moravcsik, The 
Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000); 
Simmons, Commitment & Compliance, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
157. See generally BOYLE, supra note 25. 
158. See Beth Simmons, Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights 
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domestic institutions-and, perhaps even more importantly, given that international 
law is, after all, law, and law is dealt with through legal institutions-an examination 
of the role of the law as a constraint on a state's decision-making process could 
provide new explanations for state behavior. 
France and the United States are similar in many ways, sharing common liberal 
traditions, values, and beliefs, as well as maintaining a long-standing alliance. 159 This 
makes it crucial to understand why the two countries have taken different approaches 
to international law and have maintained differing beliefs on the authority of 
international law as a guide for state action. Much of the social science research from 
the past several decades suggests that the United States and France, as similarly 
situated countries, should take the same approach to international law. 160 Both are 
advanced Western capitalist democracies; they are traditional allies who have a long-
standing respect for the rule oflaw. One might think that these similarities in values 
and economic position would lead to them sharing an identical approach to the 
international system, including international law. 161 
The United States and France do not always take different positions on the 
validity, existence, or importance ofinternational law, and both are generally adherents 
to international law. 162 However, this essay reveals that there are historical differences 
in the legal traditions of the two countries that influence the approaches taken by 
France and the United States towards international law. The unique characteristics of 
each state's legal history have created distinctive views on what international law 
means, how easily it is incorporated into the domestic legal structure of the state, and 
how it is to be interpreted and amended. These different views have, sometimes, 
created a difference of opinion between France and the United States on the 
appropriate course of action under international law. This difference of opinion is not 
indicative of a rift between allies, nor is it an indication that one state is more law-
abiding than the other. Each state simply has its own constitutive view of the role of 
law in society that frames all decisions it takes in terms of action in the international 
system. This, I suggest, is what we saw in the case of the U.S.-French debate leading 
up to the recent intervention in Iraq. 
Obligations, in INT'L LEGAL STUD. WORKING PAPER SERIES (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Boalt Hall Sch. of 
Law, 2002) [hereinafter Simmons, Why Commit?); Sonia Cardenas, Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects 
of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior, 6 INT'L STUDIES REV. 213 (2004 ). 
159. Indeed, since the American Revolution, when France came to the aid of the emerging United States 
in their struggle against the British, France and the United States have had a strong relationship. France and 
the United States "respect the values" of one another and "have the same sense of history." With republics 
founded on the same liberal, Enlightenment values, France and the United States have, in the words of 
President Chirac, "always stood together and have never failed to be there for one another. That's been the 
case since Yorktown and it still holds true today." Interview with Jacques Chirac, at the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Sept. 8, 2002), http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/France. 
160. See generally Simmons, Int'/ Agreements, supra note 8. 
161. Cf William J. Dixon, Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict, 88 AM. POL. 
Sci. REV. (1994) (predicting "that democratic states embroiled in disputes will be more likely than others 
to achieve peaceful settlements"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 
6 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 503 (1995); Simmons, Int'/ Agreements, supra note 8. 
162. See supra p. 20. 
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As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, however, many other explanations 
have been raised as to the differences of opinion between France and the United States, 
some predicting dire outcomes as a result of this most recent split. Do any of these 
theories provide a better explanation than the one offered here? For example, what 
about the effect of the relative positions of power of France and the United States as 
an explanation for their different positions? Proponents of power theory argue that 
international law is simply an epiphenomena! manifestation of interests and is only 
made effective through the balance ofpower. 163 Rather than viewing the legal tradition 
of a state as a fundamental component of the values and identity of the state, 
proponents of power politics point to the positions of states within the international 
community. Under the power politics theory, the United States, as the world's sole 
superpower, has the ability to disregard international law if it so desires, while France, 
as a great power but not a superpower, does not have the luxury of ignoring 
international norms, and still must be concerned with maintaining a coalition with 
other "law-abiding" states to balance the power of the United States. 164 
I would suggest that theories based on power relations among states are 
incomplete. Power certainly plays a role in state behavior; in simply considering 
international law an "epiphenomenon" ofinterests, however, power-based explanations 
fail to explain why norms exist at all. 165 Furthermore, power theories are not able to 
explain the consistency in the behavior of these states-particularly the United 
States-towards international law throughout history. Power theory would argue that 
the United States, as the world's sole superpower, has the ability to ignore international 
law if it wants and change it if it wants. This, the argument goes, is why the United 
States went ahead and intervened in Iraq, despite the lack ofU.N. approval. However, 
an examination of U.S. history with regard to international norms points to the 
opposite conclusion. The United States did not begin its shift to great power status 
until the tum of the 19th century, and did not achieve great power status until World 
War 11.166 In the preceding period, the United States was inferior to major European 
powers such as England, France, and Spain, in terms of military, naval, and, in some 
cases, economic power. Yet the United States, on several occasions during the period 
from 1787 to 1898, engaged in actions that would belie its power position. 167 This 
163. See Kenneth Waltz, THEORY OF INrERNATIONAL PoLmcs (1979); BOYLE, supra note 25, at 7 ("In 
the realist view of international relations, international law and organizations totally lack any intrinsic 
significance within the utilitarian calculus of international political decision making."). See also L. 
Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 1912); J. G. Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? 
Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. (1998). 
164. See generally ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Simmons, Int'/ 
Agreements, supra note 8; Simmons, Commitment & Compliance, supra note 8. 
165. See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLmcs (1999); Martha 
Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism, 50 INT'L ORG. 
(1996). 
166. BOYLE, supra note 25, at 56. 
167. Examples of this behavior include the War of 1812, the enactment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, 
the Mexican-American War of 1846, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. In each of these cases, the 
United States engaged in activity either directly or indirectly against a great power, in a way contrary to what 
power theorists would predict, yet in each case the United States felt that it was behaving in accordance with 
the laws of nations. On these examples, see DUROSELLE, supra note 7, at 45-49, and BOYLE, supra note 25 
at 23-24, 56. 
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history indicates that compliance with international rules and action within the 
international system is not merely a result of power, but is rather based on the state's 
view of the appropriate course of behavior: the legal framework guides the decision, 
and concerns regarding power are moderated by the state's legal tradition. 168 
As for the arguments that the United States can act the way it wants to simply 
because it is the most powerful country in the world, two responses are in order. First, 
an historical look at the actions taken by the United States in relation to international 
law indicates that U.S. treatment of international law has been consistent throughout 
its history, whether from the perspective of adhering to and abiding by treaties or other 
obligations, or in terms of pushing the boundaries to create new international norms. 
Second, post-WWII, the United States has been the predominant power across the 
globe; certainly, post-Cold War, the United States is the only country in the world with 
enough military power to carry out operations around the world. If the explanation of 
power theorists is true, then the United States would have no need whatsoever to 
adhere to international norms at any time-yet the United States continues to engage 
in the international legal process, sign on to treaties, actively participate in the 
international community, and support existing interpretations ofinternational law most 
of the time, just as France, Britain, Italy, Germany, Australia, and other advanced 
democracies do. 169 
Historical analysis indicates that differences between the United States and her 
allies surface in those situations which call for a decision to be taken that might be on 
the fringe of international law-something which pushes the boundaries of 
international law beyond their current limits. This was the case in Iraq in 2003. The 
United States did not flout international law in Iraq, but rather viewed the new 
circumstance evolving out of the situation as a call for a new interpretation of existing 
law. Like France, the United States is a country founded on the rule of law; and 
168. But see KAGAN, supra note I, in which the author suggests that the post-World War II rise in U.S. 
power at the expense of Europe is the explanation for, for example, the United States's "reliance on force 
as a tool of international relations." The historical evidence contradicts Kagan's assessment in two ways. 
First, the United States has adhered, and continues to adhere, to international law most of the time. Second, 
the United States has been and continues to be willing to challenge rules of international law when they are 
deemed outmoded (or, in the alternative, to declare new principles when necessary). Because of the way 
that law is perceived in the United States, and because of the form of institutions that have developed, the 
United States treats international law not only as a rule to be obeyed, but also one that can be changed when 
necessary. This has been the case when the United States was a brand-new country and when it was the 
world's sole superpower. 
169. To be sure, power theorists are correct when they note that "[s]trong powers naturally view the 
world different[ly] than weaker powers." KAGAN, supra note I, at 27. However, it is not enough to simply 
rely on power position as the explanation. Certainly the United States has more power than France, but at 
the same time, most of the time the United States works together with France and other allies to formulate 
the best possible diplomacy or best possible course of action under the law. Although it could do so if it 
wanted to, the United States does not invade every country that disagrees with it, or undermine every 
business that competes with its own. On the other hand, there are states in the world that have nowhere near 
the power of the United States, yet engage in behavior in the international system that belies their lack of 
power. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, North Korea, Iran, and various African states have all engaged in 
policies or actions in the international arena that are more aggressive than perhaps their actual power can 
support. One reason for this is that these states have a willingness to ignore the rules of international law, 
rules that constrain states like the United States and France because of the beliefs in those two states that 
law governs society. 
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neither country is more law-abiding than the other. What I am suggesting is that, 
because of the historical legal tradition of the United States, and the resulting meaning 
the law has assumed, coupled with the institutional framework in place to deal with the 
law, the United States is more willing to look at the possible reaches of a given tenet 
of international law, and argue the distinctions in a new situation that call for a new 
interpretation. This is the same technique that lawyers use in arguing cases before the 
courts in the United States every day-in fact, it is the primary method by which new 
law is made. This is not the way that law is made in France, but it is the way that law 
is made in the United States. Each country approaches problems differently and may, 
therefore, have different interpretations of what international law says, and what 
actions are allowable thereunder. 
Another explanation provided by scholars for the different approaches to 
international law between France and United States centers on the issue ofinterests. 170 
Interest theory would argue that a state's actions are determined by its assessment of 
what is necessary to protect or promote its own interests. 171 This interests-based theory 
claims that in the case of the intervention in 2003, the United States underwent a 
rational-choice calculation of costs and benefits, and determined that it was in its 
interests to intervene in Iraq, despite existing international norms that would have 
constrained any other country. France, on the other hand, made a determination that 
its interests would be better served by continuing with weapons inspections. 172 This 
view is closely related to the above explanation which focused on power capabilities. 
The United States, as a superpower, has the military and economic might to follow its 
own interests, despite some opposition. France, it could be argued, does not. 
As with power-based explanations, however, interest-based theories do not 
provide a nuanced explanation of the behavior ofFrance and the United States towards 
international law. In the case of Iraq, for example, as Jacques Chirac himself 
indicated, 173 France and the United States had the same interests: ensuring there were 
no weapons of mass destruction contrary to U.N. mandate, and that there were no 
terrorist cells; and seeing the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Where France 
and the U.S. differed was on the best means to protect their stated interests. The 
United States, influenced by its own historical development, believed the best way to 
protect its interests was an immediate attack; if this position required a shift in the 
understanding of pre-existing international law, then so be it-new situations call for 
new rules. France, on the other hand, felt the best way to protect its interests, as well 
as those of the international community, was through further diplomatic maneuvering. 
These sharp differences did not alter the fact that both countries ultimately wanted the 
same outcome; an outcome that would indeed protect their tangible interests. What 
these differences did highlight, however, was the length to which each state would go 
to protect its interests. The United States was willing to risk flouting international law 
170. See generally Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences as Intervening 
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); Cardenas, supra note 158; Simmons, 
Commitment & Compliance, supra note 8; Simmons, Why Commit?, supra note 158. 
17 I. See generally Krasner, supra note I 70; Cardenas, supra note 158; Simmons, Commitment & 
Compliance, supra note 8; Simmons, Why Commit?, supra note 158. 
172. See Interview with Jacques Chirac, French President, supra note 3. 
173. Id. 
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by charging ahead with military force. France was unwilling to engage in force, but 
was willing to continue working towards a solution through the United Nations. What, 
other than their differing legal histories, can fully account for these very different 
approaches to achieving the same goals? 
A third potential explanation offered for the differing positions of the United 
States and France on international law over the past several decades is that the United 
States and France see different roles for themselves in the international community, 
and are acting consistently with these visions. Historically, France has been a 
diplomatic leader, preferring negotiation and discussion through multilateral 
diplomatic channels to engaging in more direct action. 174 This approach is consistent 
with France's diplomatic history. For example, in the months leading up to the start 
of World War II, France (and Britain) engaged in a policy of appeasement with Hitler, 
resorting to almost continuous diplomatic maneuvers in hopes of averting another war. 
Even after Hitler engaged in breaches of international law, France preferred to 
continue diplomacy rather than act. 17s Another example can be seen more recently in 
the case of the conflict that embroiled the region of the former Yugoslavia. Europe, 
with France in the diplomatic lead as usual, could not agree on a tactic with regard to 
the ongoing conflict in Bosnia and other areas of the former Yugoslavia. The United 
States had to push intervention in the Balkan conflicts based on humanitarian and 
security grounds, ultimately acting through NATO, even though many thought that it 
would be more appropriate for the European Union to address the crisis. Once again 
the French predilection towards diplomacy and discussion, rather than action, created 
a divide between the United States and France. 176 
The United States, on the other hand, possessing as it does a legal tradition based 
on the freedoms associated with the founding of the country, views self-initiative and 
action as valid responses to new situations. Reputation in the United States is built 
through individual achievement. Even bending the rules is regarded with tolerance 
if an individual is trying to "make something of himself." The legal system in turn 
supports this by creating a system in which creative lawyering-distinguishing the 
differences, finding the unique circumstances in any given situation-can result in a 
new rule favorable to one's client, even if such a law did not exist at the time of his 
action. Acting first and arguing the consequences later is part of the American legal 
tradition. France, on the contrary, does not share this tradition. The judicial system 
is based on carefully constructed written codes, codes designed to cover all possible 
scenarios that might arise for the express purpose that the general population 
understand the rules and abide by them. This, in the French view, creates a society in 
174. But here we are faced with a problem of principle, I would say a moral problem. Are we 
going to wage war when there's perhaps a means of avoiding it? In line with her tradition, 
France is saying: 'If there's a way to avoid it, it must be avoided.' And we shall do our 
utmost to do so. 
Interview with Jacques Chirac, French President, supra note 3. 
175. KAGAN, supra note I, at 15. 
176. General Wesley Clark complained that an "unambiguous and clear warning" could not be sent to 
Milosevic because the European states, with France in the lead, would not act without a U.N. Security 
Council mandate. Quoted in KAGAN, supra note I, at 48. Clark goes on to say that it "was always the 
Americans who pushed for escalation to new, more sensitive targets ... and always some of the Allies who 
expressed doubts and reservations." Id. 
HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 373 2006
2006] THOUGHT VERSUS ACTION 373 
which all are on an even playing field, everyone knows what the law does, and thus 
everyone is protected. Changes in these rules may only come about with the 
participation of the entire community, not through individual judicial decisions. 
Naturally, there are exceptions to these general statements, as no legal system is 
an absolute. Certainly the United States has statutory law designed to protect the 
community good, and judges in France are deciding more and more cases in a manner 
similar to the United States. The underlying beliefs about the role of law, however, 
which have been formed through the historical development of the legal tradition, do 
seem to reflect the recent behavior of the United States and France, and do explain 
why there was such as difference of opinion. The U.S. action in pushing the 
boundaries of the definition of anticipatory intervention, arguing that circumstances 
have changed and therefore a new concept is needed--even if the international 
community as a whole has not yet agreed on such a change-is perfectly in line with 
the general attitudes Americans have about law. At the same time, the French view 
that continued diplomacy and discussion was the appropriate course of action, in line 
with existing international law, and that no drastic changes could have been made 
without community agreement, is in line with historical French views of the law. 
Thus, while the role-based position has some merit, it serves in fact to bolster this 
essay's contention that legal tradition, developed out of historical circumstances, 
provides a better explanation for U.S. and French differences. France, with its history 
of involvement at the center of Europe, its experience as a colonial empire, and its 
influences characterized by international tradition has a more ingrained recognition of 
existing principles of international law, which make it reluctant to act without 
thoughtful, multilateral deliberation. The United States' history of isolation, along 
with its domestic legal tradition, which has never easily incorporated international 
rules, leads the United States to feel less constrained by many existing international 
rules-but the United States is willing, when required, to push the boundaries of the 
rules that it does recognize. 
The historical examination shows that the United States and France have 
maintained their internal consistency in their individual treatment of international 
norms over time. In the United States, for example, the country's legal and political 
institutions have remained virtually identical since their inception in the late 18th 
century. Moreover, since that time, the country's position on international law has 
been consistent, despite the fact that both the United States' power position in the 
international system and the United States' interests have changed substantially. 177 
France, on the other hand, has experienced a number of changes to its political and 
legal institutions since the late 18th century, in addition to seeing its power position 
and interests change dramatically. At the same time, however, France has maintained 
its underlying belief in the values that formed the core of the French Revolution in 
1789 and its relationship to the ideals of the key legal thinkers of the Enlightenment. 
France has also held its position as a leader of diplomacy in the international system. 178 
177. See supra note I 68. 
178. "Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic ties, political engagement, the use of 
inducements rather than sanctions, compromise rather than confrontation, the taking of small steps and 
tempering ambitions for success .... " KAGAN, supra note I, at 58 (describing the tools France prefers to 
use in its international actions-in this instance, referring to the creation of the European Union). 
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Despite its shift from being a key power both in Europe and globally to being in the 
shadow of the United States, France has maintained its position as a key instigator and 
negotiator among states, adhering to international law and focusing on diplomacy as 
a means to solve problems, and emphasizing gradual change and incremental legal 
solutions. 
While all of these alternative explanations may play a part in the two countries' 
divergent positions on the intervention in Iraq and their approach to international law 
generally, they do not provide a complete explanation of these positions. A more 
comprehensive explanation comes from a deeper historical and cultural analysis. The 
legal traditions of the two countries, combined with the development oflegal cultures 
and institutional structures out of these traditions, have created two very different 
perceptions of the role that law (whether domestic or international) is to play in 
governing society, and have influenced the approach that each state has taken in 
complying with existing international law. International law does not exist in a 
vacuum, but is instead based on conceptions oflaw found in the legal traditions around 
the world. Adherence to international law, therefore, depends on the foundation ofthe 
legal tradition of the state, the historical role of law in society, and the institutional 
structures that have developed to incorporate and interpret legal principles. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the case of Iraq, the point of disagreement, again, was not the ultimate goals, 
which France and the United States agreed on, but on the means to achieve those goals. 
International law has always held that a state is allowed to defend itself, with armed 
force if necessary, against an aggressor. International law has also long held that a 
state does not have to wait to be physically attacked if it has clear evidence that such 
an attack is imminent. As international legal jurisprudence has developed, it has come 
to be held that imminent is defined as "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation." 179 This position on anticipatory self-
defense remained the international legal principle up to the 2003 action in Iraq, at 
which time its bases were questioned by the United States. 
The U.S. position on international law has been greatly influenced by its history, 
culture, and institutional structure, such that the United States has adopted a position 
on international law that is almost the complete opposite of that of France. Throughout 
its history, the people of the United States have shown an "extraordinary ambivalence" 
towards international law. 1so The American version of common law is driven by an 
entrepreneurial spirit and economic referents, where continental law is driven by social 
and political considerations. 1s1 Feelings of exceptionalism have been driven by U.S. 
history, beginning with the "City on a Hill" sermon by John Winthrop, founder of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony. 1s2 This was followed by centuries of policy of pushing the 
179. See supra note 4. 
180. See Iritani, supra note 139. 
181. See generally Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, An Entrepreneurial Conception of the Law: The American 
Model Through Italian Eyes in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken ed. 1997). 
182. William M. Wiecek, America in the Post-War Years: Transition and Transformation, 50 SYRACUSE 
L. REv. 1203-04 (2000). See also KAGAN, supra note I, at 86-87 ("The ambition to play a grand role on 
the world stage is deeply rooted in the American character. Since independence and even before, Americans 
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boundaries ofintemational law, which can be traced through the Monroe Doctrine, the 
Roosevelt Corollary, the rebuff of the League of Nations, and, most recently, the 
military intervention in Iraq. This is based on what James Opolot calls that American 
tradition of lawlessness. 183 This is not to suggest that the United States does not ever 
comply with existing international law, because it does, more often than not. Rather, 
these instances are offered as examples of the willingness of the United States 
throughout its history-whether it was in the position of a newly emerging state in the 
international system or that of the world's only superpower-to push the envelope of 
international law. 
The United States argued, in support of its efforts to amass an international 
coalition in support of military intervention in Iraq, that the international legal 
principle governing anticipatory intervention had changed as a result of the changed 
circumstances of the international community. With the creation and spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, and increasing globalization facilitating communications, 
travel, and trade in weapons, the position of the United States was that the concept of 
imminent attack must also change. The United States made, in fact, a classic common 
law argument, distinguishing the present case from previous cases to highlight why 
existing law did not apply, and in fact should be changed. The United States' position 
was that new terrorist threats and new weapons call for a new approach to stopping 
them, in order to ensure international peace and security. Lack of cooperation and 
secrecy was enough to validate military intervention to ensure one's safety. No longer 
were the traditional criteria of imminence valid, because if a state waited to respond 
until it knew for certain that it was about to be attacked, with modem weapons of mass 
destruction and modem weapons delivery systems, it would already be too late. 
Response time was reduced from weeks, to days, to hours. This created changed 
circumstances and called for a new legal norm. 
France, on the other hand, approached the problem differently. While supporting 
the goals of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, stopping terrorism, 
and encouraging the removal of Saddam Hussein, France preferred to follow the 
guidelines provided by existing international law-a law that had been around for 
centuries, and which was clear cut, already available for interpretation, and that had 
stood the test of time. Changing the components of the doctrine of anticipatory 
intervention might be possible, and indeed might be desirable, but these changes must 
come through international discussion, study, and agreement, not through an ex ante 
argument focused on distinctive circumstances. The approach of France echoed the 
French perception of law, its role, and its application. Putting faith in the political 
branches of government to come up with the best solution, the French government did 
who disagreed on many things always shared a common belief in their nations' great destiny."). 
Id. 
183. JAMES S.E. OPOLOT, AN ANALYSIS OF WORLD LEGAL TRADITIONS 1 (1980). 
People in the United States do not have the respect for law that people have in other 
countries . . . . The law-abiding tradition is not strong. On the contrary, America has a sort 
of lawless tradition, at least a fairly strong sub-culture of lawlessness, which came with the 
settlement of a new country and the pushing out to new frontiers. Many persons in the 
United States oversubscribe to the philosophy of taking chances with laws and regulations 
and getting by with infractions. 
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not agree that a new doctrine ofinternational law could be created out of the blue, even 
in response to a crisis like the terrorist attacks of September 2001. 
Different legal traditions are not equally capable of absorbing international law 
into the domestic legal system, even if the underlying social values are sympathetic to 
the international law in question. 184 For example, in common law countries, "[s]ocial 
change is thought to be introduced ... through the adaptation of precedent to new 
circumstances, not by means of legislation [of which treaties are an example]." 185 
Moreover, common law historically has been more concerned with the administration 
of justice than with justice itself. 186 This seems to fit the case oflraq in 2003, where 
the United States was seemingly so concerned with carrying out its plan of 
intervention, that there was very little consideration of whether this was the just thing 
to do, whereas the French discourse surrounding the same decision focused on 
achieving the just end to the situation, using existing lawful means. 
For the United States, law is there to protect the individual and his or her striving 
for the "American Dream." Law can be used to push the envelope, to achieve the 
results that conform with our current values. This is how law functions at the domestic 
level, and this is how the United States treats international law as well. In France, on 
the other hand, law is a safety net, a constant recognized to protect the best interests 
of society as a whole. It is not a tool to be altered on a whim. This too is carried 
forward to international law, where strict adherence to principles designed to better the 
whole is considered a moral imperative. 
Neither approach is necessarily wrong, nor better or worse than the other. And, 
in fact, both have allowed the achievement of some periods of progress when it comes 
to international law. After World War II, the United States pushed the creation of the 
modem human rights system and the modem world order. This was new; this was 
different; and this is not a system that would have likely developed out of the French 
tradition. 187 At the same time, however, the approach of France to international law is 
essential to ensure that states actually do accept and internalize international law. If 
there is no consensus among states or stability and enforcement for accepted 
principles, then international law will fail. Constant change undermines compliance 
with the law, and international law, given the vast diversity of states to which it 
applies, must maintain some consistency, and clear principles, in order to survive-to 
transcend the differences among states and be effective. So, both are necessary. The 
point of understanding how these historical differences affect the way a state 
approaches international law, and the corresponding perceptions of populations toward 
international law, is that such understanding will allow those who work to further the 
role of international law in society to understand one another, work together, and 
create a stronger international legal system. 
184. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 7, at 234. 
185. Id. 
186. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 36, at 33 I. 
187. Indeed even the development of the E. U. has largely been due to its aspects of the common law 
tradition, which allow the pushing forward of the law, rather than the more rigid bases of the civil law 
tradition. 
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